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ABSTRACT 
HOLLY ERIN COOPER WHISMAN. Regional councils and the influence of state
laws on regional governance. (Under the direction of DR. SUZANNE LELAND)
Regional decision-making, in which multiple local governments seek to address 
concerns that affect communities across jurisdictional boundaries, has been approached by
scholars from two opposing viewpoints. Some argue in favor of consolidated regional or 
metropolitan government, while others prefer voluntary cooperation or regional 
governance. The first approach represents structural regionalism, while the latter reflects 
the potential for functional regionalism. Regional councils are organizations that work to 
facilitate communication, and at least ostensibly cooperation, between local governments. 
Approximately 700 such organizations are currently operating in the United States. State 
statutes related to regional cooperation and regional councils are present in all but six 
states, and fall into one of two categories—enabling or prescriptive. Enabling legislation 
allows local governments to form partnerships with others while prescriptive legislation 
requires jurisdictions within a given state-defined “region” to belong to a particular 
regional council. This research compiled a list of all active regional councils in the 
United States, and administered a survey to the executive directors of those organizations 
to better understand the work they endeavor to conduct. This study also coded the type of 
state legislation and analyzed the directors’ survey responses to determine the influence 
of the two different types of state laws. Results from logistic and ordinal logistic 
regression analyses suggest that the type of state legislation is less important than other 
organizational and community characteristics, such as whether or not the council operates 
as a metropolitan planning organization, the region’s history of working together, and 
iv 
recent population change. Qualitative review of open-ended survey responses provides 
context, suggesting the inherent weakness of voluntary regional councils, and the 
importance of support at the state level and strong leadership both within the regional 
council and within its member jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND LITERATURE 
 
 
As local governments seek innovative responses to service demands, regional 
councils can utilize network governance to facilitate cooperation between two or more 
jurisdictions (Wolf & Bryan 2009; Visser 2004; Grigsby 1996). Regional councils of 
government provide a range of services to their member jurisdictions, some of which are 
directly related to interlocal problem solving, from overseeing joint purchase programs to 
providing a template for interlocal cooperative agreements between municipalities 
(Leland & Whisman 2012).  
Many regional councils were formed in response to incentives from the federal 
government (Grigsby 1996) and a wave of state legislation adopted in the late 1960s and 
into the 1970s. Forty-four of fifty states have blanket laws pertaining to regional 
governance. Those state statutes typically fall into one of two categories—enabling 
legislation or prescriptive legislation. This research seeks to illuminate the role of state 
laws in the ability of regional councils to address both small-scale and large-scale issues 
that span across jurisdictional boundaries. How does state legislation affect the ways in 
which these organizations operate? Do the different types of legislation lead regional 
councils to function differently? Further, are regional councils able to facilitate 
cooperation between entire regions of jurisdictions, or are they primarily conduits for 
information, providing access to funding from higher levels of government and technical 
assistance? 
 
 
The current literature provides mostly descriptive analysis and some case studies 
regarding regional councils (for example, Visser 2004; Wolf & Bryan 2009; Wood 2006; 
Vogel & Nezelkewicz; Gordon 2007). Though regional governance is often theorized to 
be an effective alternative to regional government, very little empirical work has been 
conducted regarding regional councils and their efforts to coordinate service provision or 
solve region-wide problems
1
. This study seeks to fill that gap. 
1.1: Theory 
Public goods are those that are non-excludable and non-divisible. Because they do 
not readily generate profit, public goods are unlikely to be produced and provided by the 
market. A primary role of government is to ensure that socially desirable public goods are 
produced. This can be quite complicated as what is socially desirable is at least in part a 
subjective determination. Further complicating matters at the local level is the patchwork 
of multiple local governments operating in metropolitan areas. Which local government 
should be responsible for which goods and services?  
Parks and Oakerson (2000) point out that the scale of the provision of public 
goods should ideally match the scale of the goods themselves. This implies that small-
scale goods or services would be provided by small, local governments, while services 
that are more regional in nature should be provided at the regional level. However, the 
―correct‖ size of government does not exist to respond to some service needs or demands 
(Chakraborty 2010). While a proliferation of small local governments is capable of 
                                            
1
 Bowman and Franke (1984) conducted a survey of regional council executive directors in 1981, at a time 
when these organizations were ―retrenching‖ due to federal devolution and funding cuts. I am not aware of 
any such studies since that time.  
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providing the small-scale services, regional government is largely absent in the United 
States
2
. 
Another role of government is to mitigate the effect of externalities (Downs 
1994). The potential for externalities that cross jurisdictional boundaries, particularly in 
highly fragmented areas with numerous local governments, creates a situation in which 
communicating (at the very least) and cooperating (ideally) with other local governments 
is in the best interest of the public. Local governments are further expected to achieve 
technical efficiencies and find cost savings (Oakerson 1999; Bish 2000), and provide 
opportunities for citizens to engage in democratic participation (Frug 2000) and express 
their voice (Warner & Hefetz 2002; Hefetz, Warner, & Vigoda-Gadot 2012). These 
numerous responsibilities have long led observers to theorize on the ideal or optimal 
governmental structure for addressing region-wide problems. Local government in a 
regional context provides a specific example of a broader issue of problem solving in 
complex environments. 
Elinor Ostrom acknowledged the complexity of problem solving in the public 
sector, and referred to the social dilemmas that commonly emerge: 
―Social dilemmas occur whenever individuals in interdependent situations 
face choices in which the maximization of short-term self-interest yields 
outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives. In a 
public-good dilemma, for example, all those who would benefit from the 
provision of a public good—such as pollution control, radio broadcasts, or 
weather forecasting—find it costly to contribute and would prefer others 
to pay for the good instead. If everyone follows the equilibrium strategy, 
then the good is not provided or is underprovided. Yet, everyone would be 
better off if everyone were to contribute‖ (Ostrom 1998, 1).  
 
                                            
2
 Metro in the Portland, Oregon, area and, in some regards, the Metropolitan Council in the Minneapolis – 
St. Paul area are the two examples most closely resembling regional government in the U.S.  
3
 
 
Ostrom challenged social scientists to understand how people overcome such 
social dilemmas in certain situations and given certain variables, and to advance rational 
choice theory to understand why some groups fail to overcome the challenges of 
collective action. Regional problem solving provides a specific example of a public-good 
dilemma. 
Two theoretical camps have guided the work on regional problem solving and the 
local public sector‘s role in the delivery of public goods and services and mitigation of 
externalities. The first indicates regional, metropolitan, or consolidated government, 
while the other calls for a voluntary approach to regional governance requiring individual 
local governments to cooperate with one another where appropriate. Researchers have 
applied a variety of titles to the opposing philosophies. Metropolitan government 
reformers called for consolidated government, among other Progressive Era reforms 
(Stephens & Wilkstrom 2000). Conversely, the term ―new regionalism‖ was applied to a 
non-structural approach to regional cooperation (Savitch & Vogel 2000). Others have 
simply provided a distinction between regional government and regional governance 
(Rosentraub & al-Habil 2009). Others still use the labels of regionalists vs. localists to 
distinguish between the two opposing theories (Jimenez & Hendrick 2010). The two 
approaches, regardless of the labels applied to them, have sometimes resulted in rather 
polarized, ideological standpoints. 
Jimenez and Hendrick (2010) point out that this debate has raged for at least a 
century. However, the question is far from resolved. From the mid-1980s through 2007, 
more than 8,000 new local governments emerged (an increase of more than seven 
percent), many of them special districts designed to carry out a single special purpose 
4
 
 
(Jimenez & Hendrick 2010). Though the recent recession has resulted in a wave of 
consolidation discussions among local officials across the country seeking cost savings 
and greater efficiency, empirical research does not support the claim that such 
consolidations, even if approved by voters, would improve the lot of those local 
governments considering mergers. Leland & Thurmaier (2010) found that technical 
efficiency, economic development, and other promises of consolidation were not ensured 
by a successful consolidation referendum. Additionally, Boyne (1992) found higher costs 
associated with fewer, more consolidated local governments, and Deller & Rudnicki 
(1992) identified that improving managerial capacity was preferable to consolidating 
governments as it resulted in greater efficiency without aggregating citizen preferences
3
.  
Those advocating for metropolitan government have continued to argue that the 
current local government landscape is incapable of being efficient or capturing 
economies of scale
4
, and too fragmented to address region-wide concerns. While some 
goods and services are small scale, can be produced cost-effectively, and the decisions of 
one jurisdiction have little or no impact on nearby communities, other local government 
decisions directly or indirectly affect the quality of life in other jurisdictions. Further, 
some public goods do not ―belong‖ to any specific level of government, and therefore are 
frequently not addressed at all. Land-use planning and transportation planning, along 
with economic development and environmental protection, are examples of services that 
can easily affect surrounding communities, and which are frequently not considered in a 
coordinated, comprehensive manner, potentially resulting in socially undesirable 
                                            
3
 Dollery & Crase (2005) and Dollery & Johnson (2006) also find fault with Australian state policies that 
force local government consolidations for their heavy-handedness and overlooking more effective 
alternatives. 
4
 However, Boyne (1992) refutes the notion that fragmentation is associated with higher costs for services. 
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outcomes (Chakraborty 2010) or in externalities (Olberding 2009). Lowery (1998) uses 
such ―quasi-market failures‖ to advocate consolidated local governments characterized 
by centralized decision-making. However, this approach is not supported by empirical 
research, or by the prevailing political will as gauged by the likelihood of failure for 
consolidation referenda (Leland & Thurmaier 2004, 2010). Therefore the utility of the 
theory that fewer, larger governments are preferable to a system of many small, and often 
overlapping, local governments, is obsolete. As metropolitan or regional government is 
rare and unlikely to emerge given political and feasibility issues, in addition to the 
concerns raised by public choice scholars, some academics and practitioners turned to 
voluntary cooperation as a solution to interlocal problem solving.  
Public choice scholars, who valued a multiplicity of local governments for 
numerous purported benefits, pointed out that ―polycentric political systems‖ are capable 
of providing public goods and services in a coordinated manner, while also mitigating 
potential externalities (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961). These theorists responded to 
the notion that fragmented systems of local government were inherently flawed, as the 
Progressive Era reformers had argued. Instead they cautioned that ―gargantua,‖ or large, 
centralized, metropolitan governments would be ―insensitive and clumsy in meeting the 
demands of local citizens for public goods,‖ (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961, 837).  
Instead they advocated separating provision from production—in other words 
allowing for contracting out to a private company for services or coordinating with other 
local governments to individually provide, but collectively produce, public goods and 
services. Advantages of these approaches include greater flexibility to respond to 
6
 
 
changing demands through market-like mechanisms (Rosentraub & al-Habil 2009), as 
well as promoting greater efficiency or capturing cost savings (Warner & Hefetz 2002)
5
.  
Networks of local governments in which leaders work across boundaries to solve 
problems became important to governance theory. Building on O‘Toole‘s (1997) advice 
to ―take networks seriously,‖ Thurmaier and Wood (2002) used social network theory to 
explain public management networks as exchange networks. Warm (2011) and Silvia 
(2011) both address the importance of a particular type of network leadership that is 
increasingly important in overcoming the barriers to cooperation. Similarly, scholars have 
utilized collective action theory (Olberding 2009, 2002) and have developed an 
institutional collective action framework (Feiock 2005; Hawkins & Andrew 2010) to 
understand how partnerships between jurisdictions develop. These theories are in contrast 
to those that characterize jurisdictions in structurally fragmented regions as locked in 
fierce competition with one another (Tiebout 1956; Gordon 2007). Krueger (2006) argues 
that when ―cities with comparable characteristics [are] in close proximity,‖ we should 
expect them to compete with one another for relative gains. However, Krueger points out 
that fragmentation does not eliminate the possibility for cooperation, as ―fragmentation is 
a double-edged sword‖ (Krueger 2006, 1). In other words, even in the presence of 
competition, having multiple neighboring jurisdictions presents local leaders with many 
opportunities to cooperate on at least some of the services they provide.  
Calls for voluntary cooperation between local governments have long been met 
with the response that numerous examples of voluntary cooperation already exist (Nunn 
                                            
5
 Warner & Hefetz (2002) found that both privatization and interlocal cooperation promote efficiency, 
however interlocal cooperation is associated with greater equity and citizen ―voice.‖ They remind readers 
that cities are not merely service delivery units, but also play a role in promoting democracy, civic 
discourse (including discussions about how best to provide and produce services) and community. 
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& Rosentraub 1997; Rosentraub & al-Habil 2010). Much of the literature on the topic of 
regional governance focuses on interlocal agreements, as a somewhat measurable form of 
cooperation between localities. Empirical evidence suggests that interlocal agreements 
are frequently used in regions throughout the country. ILAs allow for some jurisdictions 
to contract out the production of a service to another jurisdiction, for two or more 
jurisdictions to jointly provide and produce a good or service, or for multiple jurisdictions 
to collectively contract out the production of a good or service to a private firm. These 
mechanisms are evidence of the concepts the public choice theorists argued were possible 
many decades ago—that by conceptualizing provision and production separately, 
numerous arrangements were possible other than the model of each jurisdiction both 
providing and producing each good or service its citizens demanded.  
Despite the many opportunities for cooperation within a fragmented system to 
which Krueger (2006) and Nunn & Rosentraub (1997) refer, cooperation on large-scale 
issues involving multiple jurisdictions is not a sure thing. The proliferation of ILAs does 
not suggest that regional governance through voluntary cooperation is resolving all 
region-level issues. Therefore, theorists‘ philosophies on voluntary cooperation may 
more aptly refer to small-scale service delivery issues rather than large-scale issues that 
span many jurisdictions.  
Empirical evidence suggests that ILAs may not effectively address concerns that 
are truly regional in nature, but are primarily utilized for goods or services to be 
collectively delivered by a relatively small number of neighboring jurisdictions. In fact, 
adjacent borders are a statistically significant factor in models of both the likelihood and 
amount of interlocal service cooperation (LeRoux 2008). Therefore, claims that ILAs are 
8
 
 
evidence of voluntary regional coordination are flawed in their neglect of the limited 
scale of many such agreements. Vogel & Nezelkewicz (2002) provide further evidence 
that large-scale cooperation, even when facilitated by a metropolitan planning 
organization (MPO), does not necessarily take into consideration metropolitan-wide 
interests. Chakraborty (2010) continues to explore this concern, asserting that even 
though transportation issues are often addressed at the regional level, the accompanying 
issues of land use and environmental protection are not considered in a coordinated 
manner with transportation.   
Organizations, whether regional councils of government or informal networks of 
local leaders, can play a role in brokering agreements between neighboring municipalities 
(LeRoux 2008). Such organizations are typically nonprofit organizations of a quasi-
governmental nature. Governance theorists that advocate voluntary cooperation between 
jurisdictions for interlocal cooperation would expect these types of organizations to 
originate from the ground up—or voluntarily. However, the study of organizations and 
institutions suggests a more complex reality.  
Olson (1965) pointed out that organizations exist to advance the common interests 
of their members. However, large organizations, unless they have the ability to apply 
sanctions, can result in free riders. Olson uses the example of the state collecting taxes. 
Taxes cannot be voluntary, because ―those who do not purchase or pay for any of the 
public or collective good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of 
the good, as they can where noncollective [sic] goods are concerned‖ (15). This would 
suggest that regional council organizations will have greater likelihood of advancing 
9
 
 
cooperation between their member jurisdictions—and less potential for free riders—if 
they are able to coerce participation.  
On the other hand, Ostrom (1998) argued that policies based on the assumption 
that ―rational individuals are helplessly trapped in social dilemmas from which they 
cannot extract themselves without inducements or sanctions from the outside‖ have in 
some cases caused problems worse than those they were intended to solve (3). Indeed, 
she argues, some ―players‖ choose to reciprocate cooperation, even if that action seems 
irrational from an outsider‘s perspective.  
Nonetheless, if a regional good or service is too costly for a single jurisdiction to 
provide, while others free-ride, that good or service is not likely to be provided. 
Similarly, even if individual local governments would like to address a region-wide 
problem, but do not have the cooperation of local leaders in enough communities 
throughout the region to make such action feasible, the problem in question is likely to go 
on unabated. This would be an example of a tragedy of the commons, such as Hardin 
(1961) detailed. His description of pollution is particularly relevant in terms of the debate 
about regional governance, as it involves a calculation of utility on the part of individual 
local governments and has implications that do not stop at a municipal border.  
The federal government, by providing various incentives for the creation of 
regional councils, requiring regional plans in order to receive certain types of grant 
funding, and requiring local grant applications be reviewed by a regional council
6
, 
encouraged the formation of regional councils of government (Grigsby 1996)
7
. It further 
encouraged the development of MPOs, a particular type of regional council, through 
                                            
6
 A process called A-95 review 
7
 Related legislation included the amended Housing Act of 1959, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act, and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (Grigsby 1996). 
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transportation legislation such as the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and later the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and Transportation 
Efficiency Act for the 21st Century or TEA-21 (Giuliano 2004).  
State governments have also provided the necessary structure to encourage and 
perhaps to coerce participation in regional councils through legislation. Forty-four of the 
fifty states have legislation regarding regional cooperation and regional councils. 
Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, the number of regional councils of government in the 
United States grew from roughly 50 to more than 650 (Grigsby 1996).  
 Vogel and Nezelkewicz (2002) write, ―Government is based on coercive power 
and command-and-control processes embedded in hierarchical organization. Governance 
is rooted in a system of cooperation that may take the form of a policy network or a 
community-based ‗governing regime‘ linking public and private elites‖ (108). When state 
or federal government requires, or even simply encourages, participation in regional 
councils, a situation arises in which government is attempting to establish governance 
with a top-down approach. Can policy makers reasonably expect coerced participation in 
governance to engender cooperation between local governments on regional concerns? 
North (1990) wrote, ―We usually observe cooperative behavior when individuals 
repeatedly interact, when they have a great deal of information about each other, and 
when small numbers characterize the group,‖ (12). Like North, Ostrom (1998) highlights 
the importance of face-to-face interactions in generating cooperation and reciprocity. 
From this perspective, local leaders who are ―coerced‖ to interact could develop a shared 
sense of trust and cooperation over time. On the other hand, membership in a regional 
council could be something that local governments maintain because they are required to 
11
 
 
do so, but without actively engaging or developing meaningful relationships with other 
nearby communities that share the same regional issues.  
What leads regional councils to address region-wide problems? State coercion? 
State support without coercion? Does state legislation regarding regional councils affect 
the likelihood of face-to-face interaction, which should in turn lead to a greater sense of 
trust and a greater likelihood of cooperation? This project seeks to advance the scholarly 
work regarding government and governance, specifically those aspects related to regional 
councils. 
1.2: Literature on Regional Governance 
The structural organization of local government in the United States has long been 
the focus of debate. An important distinction exists between metropolitan government, 
such as city-county consolidated government, and metropolitan governance, in which 
cooperative or collaborative arrangements are formed between jurisdictions without a 
structural consolidation (Parks & Oakerson 2000; Orfield 1997; Savitch & Vogel 2000; 
Stephens & Wilkstrom 2000; Olberding 2002).  
Regional government is uncommon in the United States, with city-county 
consolidation being the form of government most closely resembling regional 
government
8
. However, such structural consolidations do not usually consolidate all the 
local governments within a given county, or all the functions of the local governments 
involved. Further, attempts to merge city and county governments typically fail. Even 
when referenda are successful, the resulting structurally consolidated governments 
largely fail to deliver on the intended goals such as technical efficiency (Leland & 
Thurmaier 2010).  
                                            
8
 With the exception of METRO, in the Portland, Oregon, area 
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In light of these findings, many scholars have turned to regional governance as the 
answer to issues involving more than one jurisdiction or in pursuit of cost savings and 
efficiencies. So-called ―new regionalists‖ have focused on the potential of governance 
strategies, acknowledging the difficulty of forming metropolitan governments, to solve 
problems that span jurisdictional boundaries (Savitch & Vogel 2000). However, the 
argument that regional governance holds more promise than regional government 
remains largely in the realm of theory, with little basis in empirical evidence or 
evaluation of outcomes
9
.  
1.3: Interlocal Agreements 
An observable output of regional governance is the interlocal agreement (ILA). 
Much of the literature on regional governance has focused on ILAs, as a form of 
functional consolidation meant to capture economies of scale and reduce duplication. 
ILAs have grown more common in recent years (Kwon & Feiock 2010; LeRoux & Carr 
2007; Thurmaier & Wood 2002). In fact, Wood (2006) estimated that 72 percent of the 
service delivery strategies in the Kansas City metropolitan area fell into one of six 
categories of inter-jurisdictional arrangements
10
.  
Scholars have attributed the proliferation of ILAs in part to a response to 
changing economic and community circumstances, as well as the influence of 
participating in regional networks such as councils of government (COGs) (Thurmaier & 
                                            
9
 Some rare exceptions to the lack of empirical work on this topic include Olberding (2002; 2009), who has 
examined the outcomes of one type of regional network, economic development partnerships, and the work 
of Boyne (1992), which discredits the notion that consolidated governments are associated with lower costs 
than fragmented local governments. 
10
 The six types of intergovernmental arrangements identified by Wood (2006) include: contracting out to a 
nongovernmental entity in association with other public entities; joint provision of a service with one or 
more other public entities; contracting out to another public entity; service provided to a jurisdiction‘s 
residents by another public entity; providing a service to the residents of another jurisdiction; and 
partnering with a regional council for a service. LeRoux and Carr (2007) provide just three types of ILA: 
intergovernmental service contracts; joint service agreements, and intergovernmental service transfers.  
13
 
 
Wood 2002; LeRoux & Carr 2007; Parks & Oakerson 2000). One type of regional 
governance network—the metropolitan planning organization (MPO)—was promoted by 
the federal government, through transportation legislation, to coordinate transportation 
planning at the regional level (Vogel & Nezelkewicz 2002). Roughly half of all MPOs 
operate within a broader regional council within the same geographic area, according to 
the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC)
11
. Other types of regional 
councils, such as councils of governments (COGs) also provide coordination for 
numerous local government functions, though the effectiveness of such councils is 
dependent on local government representatives being willing to enact local policies 
aligned with the regional goals (Visser 2004)
12
. 
More than a decade ago, O‘Toole (1997) recognized that network governance was 
becoming more complex, and predicted that trend was likely to continue. Within the issue 
of network governance, Weber and Khandemian (2008) recognize the particular 
challenge of knowledge transfer across network participants in resolving ―wicked‖ or 
complex problems that cross boundaries. Inter-jurisdictional cooperation is an example of 
networks of public management actors seeking to work together across boundaries, 
according to Thurmaier and Wood (2002, 585). ILAs ―represent one alternative for 
managing multijurisdictional problems‖ (LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010, 268). 
They are a ―potential endogenous solution to fragmentation and the collective action 
problems that cities face in the provision of public service‖ (Kwon & Feiock 2010, 882).  
Many types of interlocal cooperative agreements can be formed between two or 
more municipalities in order to leverage purchasing power, to plan for mutual aid, or to 
                                            
11
 NARC website, retrieved August 15, 2011, from: http://narc.org/ 
12
 Warm (2011) also focuses on the importance of leadership in overcoming barriers to cooperation. 
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contract with a service provider—be it a private firm or a public sector entity that has a 
comparative advantage in the production of a given service. Thurmaier and Wood (2002) 
assert that most cities and counties are engaged in at least one ILA.  
Parks and Oakerson (2000) point out that the provision of public goods happens 
through a fragmented system of ―nested‖ local governments, and many alternative forms 
of the production of those same goods exist. They focus particular attention on the scale 
of the service in question, arguing not only that the scale of a good should match its 
provision unit, but also that, ―provision units and production units can be linked in 
various ways,‖ including through interlocal cooperative agreements (171).  
1.4: Motivations for Engaging in ILAs 
Many motivations for participating in ILAs have appeared in the academic 
literature. These include cost savings or a desire to achieve economies of scale, the 
influence of fiscal stress, changing circumstances that reduce the capacity of any single 
jurisdiction to respond to public expectations, flexibility, the presence of a policy 
entrepreneur, the presence of administrative (rather than political) local leadership, and 
perhaps most importantly the influence of a social network of neighboring jurisdictions 
characterized by trust and long-standing relationships. This social networks explanation 
is central to the theory underlying much of the recent work on interlocal cooperation.  
According to Thurmaier and Wood (2002), cost savings is one of the foremost 
reasons cited for entering into an ILA. Fiscal stress, or perceived fiscal stress, is 
recognized as a motivation for collaborative partnerships between jurisdictions (Cigler 
1999; Olberding 2002). As conditions at the local government level change, particularly 
fiscal conditions, ILAs have become an increasingly common tool for delivering services 
15
 
 
(LeRoux & Carr 2007; Kwon & Feiock 2010). In their two-stage model of ILA 
formation, Kwon & Feiock (2010) identified a statistically significant inverse relationship 
between own-source revenue and consideration of ILA, as well as a correlation between 
population decline and the likelihood of considering ILA as an option for service 
delivery
13
. This finding supports the notion that jurisdictions facing fiscal pressure may 
be inclined to consider the option of cross-boundary cooperation
14
. 
Frederickson (1999) argued that the capacity of public administrators to manage 
―complex social and economic issues has eroded significantly‖ (703). He placed the 
American metropolitan region at the center of his argument about the ―disarticulated 
state,‖ which he related to ―the declining salience of jurisdiction [and] the fuzziness of 
borders‖ (707). This ―fuzziness‖ of borders is particularly relevant in regard to issues that 
have the potential for spillovers or externalities. Such issues may be addressed through 
interlocal cooperation.  
Interlocal agreements provide flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, as 
well as being relatively easier to develop and implement than more formal regional 
strategies such as structural city-county consolidations (Kwon & Feiock 2010; Wood 
2006; LeRoux & Carr 2007; Stephens & Wilkstrom 2000; Parks & Oakerson 2000; 
Rosentraub & al-Habil 2009). The greater political feasibility of these alternatives to 
―massive jurisdictional consolidation‖ likely accounts for the increased focus on 
functional interlocal responses to service delivery (Parks & Oakerson 2000, 169). 
                                            
13
 They used ICMA‘s survey Reinventing Government: Implementation at the Local Level, 2003. 
14
 The second stage of the Kwon & Feiock (2010) model was the actual formation of an agreement, which 
they conceptualized as being a function of negotiation, political institutions, and the networks within with 
they are situated.  
Note: Kwon & Feiock (2010) conceptualized the number of local governments in the county as a factor in 
ILA consideration, however this student argues their hypothesis (of a negative correlation) is flawed, 
because many ILAs occur between just a couple of neighboring jurisdictions, rather than county-wide. 
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Additional factors identified as influencing the development of ILAs are the 
presence of one or more policy ―entrepreneurs‖ (Cigler 1999), and administrative 
leadership (Morgan & Hirlinger 1991). Conversely, the fear of losing control over the 
delivery of local services reduces the likelihood that local public administrators will enter 
into interlocal service contracts (Morgan & Hirlinger 1991).  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, trust between jurisdictions, along with a 
sense of shared destiny (Cigler 1999), is recognized as a necessary precondition for the 
development of ILAs (Thurmaier & Wood 2002; Wood 2006; LeRoux, Brandenburger, 
& Pandey 2010; Feiock 2005). As long ago as Wilkes (1975), scholars had identified the 
importance of trust, or a tradition of cooperation, as facilitating ILA participation. The 
concept of ―cooperative norms—or the extent to which parties usually act in a 
collaborative or coordinated manner‖ (Olberding 2002, 482) has become embedded in 
much of both the theoretical and empirical work on inter-jurisdictional cooperation.  
Cigler (1999) conceptualized a continuum of partnerships, leading from 
networking partnerships to cooperative, then coordinating, and finally collaborative 
partnerships. Similarly, Thurmaier and Wood (2004) categorize ILA into three levels: 
communication, coordination and collaboration. ―First, communication-level activity is 
important for building trust between officials in different jurisdictions, and this in turn 
results in an increased likelihood of higher levels of intergovernmental relations such as 
coordination and collaboration‖ (Thurmaier & Wood 2004, 123).  
Parks and Oakerson (2000) agree that the networks formed through participation 
in professional and voluntary associations ―provide forums for raising and discussing 
issues as well as negotiating and resolving differences related not only to broad questions 
17
 
 
of governance but also to operational relationships among local government agencies‖ 
(175). Indeed, Wood (2006) reports that in the Kansas City region, interlocal cooperative 
agreements are the ―preferred structure‖ of metropolitan governance, partly due to the 
network connections local leaders form with one another through their participation in the 
area‘s regional council of governments, MARC. Likewise, LeRoux, Brandenburger and 
Pandey (2010) found that face-to-face interactions between local decision makers 
facilitated interlocal cooperation for service delivery.  
However, LeRoux and Carr (2007) found that participation in regional policy and 
planning networks did not predict participation in interlocal cooperation in four service 
categories they tested using data from local governments in Michigan. Further, LeRoux 
(2008) demonstrated that, at least in the Detroit metropolitan region, participation in 
alternative ―nonprofit community conferences,‖ smaller than most regional COGs, was 
more closely related to the use of ILAs than participation in COGs, in five service 
categories. She cautions that generalizing these findings could be problematic, in part 
because of legislation in Michigan meant to encourage ILA formation.  
LeRoux‘s work illuminated an additional aspect of participating in interlocal 
agreements—that of proximity. For at least some types of services, adjacent borders are a 
statistically significant predictor of whether jurisdictions engage in interlocal cooperation 
for service delivery (LeRoux 2008). This suggests that interlocal agreements might be 
better suited for small-scale service delivery than for addressing larger, regional 
concerns. 
Complicating attempts to empirically test whether COG participation is a factor in 
the development of ILAs (or any form of regional problem solving) is the high level of 
18
 
 
variability among COGs. COGs take many different forms, and other organizations not 
technically defined as COGs could play a similar role in facilitating interlocal 
cooperation, as LeRoux (2008) demonstrates using nonprofit community conferences. 
Additionally, county-wide mayors‘ and managers‘ associations or other less formal social 
networks could produce similar results in terms of interlocal cooperation, but without 
being accounted for in empirical analyses that only focus on formal COG participation.  
Further complicating matters, some states determine precisely which local 
jurisdictions should form regional councils, in an attempt to promote cooperation. 
However simply complying through membership does not necessarily mean that a given 
jurisdiction is vested in the activities or initiatives of that regional council. The 
potentially vital role of regional councils calls for a closer examination of these 
organizations, their work, and the role they may play in facilitating interlocal 
cooperation. Empirical work on regional councils is not fully addressed in the scholarly 
literature. 
The minimal knowledge about current regional councils across the United States 
presents a unique research opportunity. Though scholars have identified participation in 
regional councils as a factor in the development of interlocal cooperation, at least in some 
instances, the variations in regional councils and the laws that govern them remain to be 
studied.  
Do regional councils facilitate cooperation between their members? If so, in what 
ways? Are they involved with doing so for both small-scale and large-scale/regional 
issues? Do state laws make a difference in whether, or how, regional councils work to 
19
 
 
generate cooperation between their member jurisdictions? Does the type of state 
legislation matter? 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY RESEARCH 
 
 
This study serves to advance knowledge about the influence of state laws on 
regional councils and their role in inter-jurisdictional cooperation between local 
governments. The importance of interlocal cooperation stems from the desire to solve 
regional problems, find efficiencies and cost savings, improve effectiveness and 
performance, provide services in a more agile or flexible manner, and in some cases even 
to share risk across jurisdictions. Cooperation occurs when local government actors 
recognize a shared interest and attempt to work together to solve problems that affect two 
or more entities. Local governments have both incentives and disincentives to cooperate, 
and will only do so if the transaction costs of establishing working relationships do not 
exceed the expected benefits of cooperation (Kwon & Feiock 2010). Regional councils 
are organizations that work to bring together individual jurisdictions. What work do 
regional councils perform that might facilitate the decisions to cooperate? And does the 
type of state legislation affect the work of regional councils, on average?  
A regional council that is established by its members, rather than by a top-down 
state mandate, is itself an interlocal agreement. From one theoretical perspective, one 
might expect that such a council will actively promote cooperation between its members 
for the delivery of services that exceed the scale of individual jurisdictions. Such a 
council exists because its members are aware that certain issues faced by each member 
affect the region as a whole. Beyond this realization is the action of establishing a 
council, which indicates it takes seriously the potential for communication, at the very 
least, and possibly cooperation or coordination of efforts as well (Ostrom 1990). 
From a different perspective, as Olson (1965) put forth, collective action in large 
groups may not occur if the parties are not encouraged or required (―coerced‖) to 
participate. If following this theoretical perspective, one might expect regional councils 
that are prescribed by legislation to be more involved in the development of interlocal 
cooperation and addressing regional issues than those organizations that are purely 
voluntary. 
2.1: Types of Regional Networks 
Scholars have identified regional councils, such as COGs and MPOs, as 
potentially facilitating inter-jurisdictional cooperation and the development of ILAs. 
Currently, no organization maintains a single complete list of regional councils. The 
National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) has the most comprehensive list of 
organizations to date
15
. NARC serves as ―a national voice for regionalism by advocating
for regional cooperation as the most effective way to address a variety of community 
planning and development opportunities and issues
16
.‖ NARC‘s list includes region-wide
COGs, associations of local governments (AOGs), regional planning and development 
agencies (RPDs), and MPOs. Additionally, the National Association of Development 
Organizations (NADO) and the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
(AMPO) also maintain lists of regional councils currently operating within the United 
States. Numerous labels are applied to regional councils, however they each fall into one 
15
 NARC‘s list contains 715 organizations, however some of these are actually county planning 
departments, rather than regional councils. 
16
According to the NARC website: www.narc.org 
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of three broad categories: COGs; MPOs; and ―Super-COGs,‖ which include an MPO 
within a broader COG organization (Leland & Whisman 2012).  
2.2: Preliminary Research 
In August and September of 2011, I communicated with executive directors of 
several regional councils across the United States. The organizations I contacted were 
selected through a web-based search of regional councils of government. At that point in 
time, I did not establish strict criteria for selection, as I was simply conducting a scan of 
regional councils. Of the nine directors I contacted, eight responded with information 
regarding the operation and formation of their organizations. The most commonly cited 
work conducted by these councils pertained to joint purchasing cooperatives, solid waste 
management, emergency response or emergency operations centers, hazardous materials 
response, and public transit. One regional council director reported that some of the 
members were involved in a purchasing cooperative, but that it had been developed 
through the work of local leaders without the assistance of the regional council
17
.  
The regional organizations in my initial research reported being involved with 
cross-jurisdictional programs in categories including local government business services, 
public works, transportation, workforce and economic development, and emergency 
management. Specific examples of the regional councils‘ activities within local 
government business services include employee assistance, drug testing, and IT and GIS 
functions. Within public works, examples include stormwater education, solid waste 
management, joint purchasing of goods ranging from rock salt to fire trucks, and animal 
control. Within the area of transportation, directors cited interlocal planning efforts, 
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 This provides evidence, as Thurmaier and Wood (2002) suggested, that social networks among local 
leaders can lead to cooperative behavior. 
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regional traffic teams, public transit, and ―alternative‖ transportation efforts, as well as 
trail maintenance. Economic development efforts included workforce development 
programs and other economic development or marketing services. Emergency 
management, as a common category of cooperation, includes operation and call centers 
as well as hazardous materials response.  
Most of the regional council directors who provided information noted that their 
membership consisted of elected officials from area local governments. Voting on issues 
or initiatives was generally not weighted, however in a couple of cases the regional 
councils have a system for more heavily weighting the votes that correspond to 
communities with larger populations.  
2.3: State Laws and Regional Councils: Enabling Legislation and Prescriptive Legislation   
The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 drew national attention to 
cooperation, both between jurisdictions and across various levels of government
18
. Most 
states across the U.S. enacted laws affecting interlocal cooperation at the local level, 
within a few years of the national legislation. Such legislation affected the activities of 
the regional councils within each given state. Though a handful of regional planning or 
service delivery organizations existed prior to the passage of such laws, many regional 
councils formed in direct response to state statutes
19
.  
My initial research of state legislation focused on whether or not enabling 
legislation existed at the state level. However, as I began researching state laws regarding 
regional councils and cooperation between local governments (in the spring of 2012), I 
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 This followed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, which established Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs) to coordinate transportation planning in areas with at least 50,000 residents. 
19
 MPOs also formed as a response to legislation, particularly federal transportation requirements rather 
than state laws. According to NARC, roughly half of the MPOs in the United States are embedded within a 
broader COG.  
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observed a fact that became fundamental to this study‘s research design
20
. Not only do
most states have legislation pertaining to regional councils, such laws fall into one of two 
distinct categories. Some states have laws that are truly ―enabling,‖ in the sense that they 
allow or enable local governments to establish regional councils as they see fit. Other 
states have what I will refer to as ―prescriptive‖ legislation, meaning that a state has 
determined that regional councils shall exist and has detailed exactly how those councils 
will operate, often indicating exactly which local governments will be grouped together 
into regional councils. 
The difference in the two types of state legislation has not been observed or noted 
in the literature to date. However, this may be an important distinction, because it 
indicates the level of involvement of the state. Therefore the type of state legislation 
serves as an independent variable for this study. 
Arkansas legislation provides an example of enabling legislation. An excerpt of 
the law reads
21
: ―Any two (2) or more cities of the first class, cities of the second class,
incorporated towns, or counties, or other civil subdivisions having adjoining planning 
jurisdictions, or any counties and cities adjacent to or within the county may jointly 
cooperate in the exercise and performance of planning powers, duties, and functions as 
provided by state law for cities and counties.‖ Without spelling out exactly how such 
cooperation might take place, or drawing boundaries for regions within the state, the 
20
 The methodology entailed identifying state statutes through searches of each state‘s legislative websites, 
and in some cases external sites such as http://law.justia.com/ and http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/ when an 
individual state‘s website did not contain the necessary information. 
21
 2010 Arkansas Code, Title 14 - Local Government, Subtitle 2 - County Government, Chapter 17 - 
County Planning, Subchapter 3 - Metropolitan or Regional Planning Commissions, § 14-17-302 - Authority 
generally. Retrieved from: http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2010/title-14/subtitle-2/chapter-
17/subchapter-3/14-17-302/ 
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language gives local governments the authority to choose how to arrange and implement 
agreements and organizations with nearby jurisdictions.  
 One example of prescriptive legislation is provided by Virginia‘s Regional 
Cooperation Act. The law first explains that it is intended, ―To improve public health, 
safety, convenience and welfare, and to provide for the social, economic and physical 
development of communities and metropolitan areas of the Commonwealth on a sound 
and orderly basis, within a governmental framework and economic environment which 
will foster constructive growth and efficient administration.‖ It further states that in order 
to accomplish this goal of orderly development, ―‗Commission‘ means a planning district 
commission. Planning district commissions are composed of the duly appointed 
representatives of the localities which are parties to the charter agreement. ‗Planning 
district‘ means a contiguous area within the boundaries established by the Department of 
Housing and Community Development.‖
22
 The law continues defining exactly how the 
regional councils will be formed and governed—in other words, prescribing the structure 
and function of the councils.  
 Additional clues to the type of state legislation are available from the 
organizations that serve, in some states, as state associations of regional councils. Some 
state association websites include maps of the regional councils within a particular state. 
Maps of regional councils will take one of two forms. The regional councils may cover 
the entire state, indicating prescriptive legislation at the state level. Or the regional 
councils will cover portions of the state, leaving other areas without a regional council, 
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 Code of Virginia, § 15.2-4200. Regional Cooperation Act. Retrieved from: http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+15.2-4200 
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indicating that councils have formed from the ground up. Virginia‘s map (Figure 1) 
shows the regional councils and commissions neatly covering the entire state.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of regional councils in Virginia
23
 
 
 
 
 
 Similarly, Texas Association of Regional Councils provides a map of the regional 
councils in Texas, showing that they cover the entire state of Texas (Figure 2). This 
confirms that the legislation in Texas is of the prescriptive type, consistent with the 
wording of Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 391: Regional Planning 
Commissions. This codes states that regional councils must be organized in a manner 
―consistent with the geographic boundaries for state planning regions or subregions that 
are delineated by the governor and that are subject to review and change at the end of 
each state biennium.‖ It further defines a regional commission as a ―political subdivision 
of the state
24
.‖ 
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 Retrieved from Virginia Association of Planning District Commissions website: 
http://vapdc.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=21 
24
 Retrieved from http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/LG/htm/LG.391.htm 
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Figure 2: Map of regional councils in Texas
25
 
 
 
 
 On the other hand, state associations of regional councils in states with enabling 
legislation provide maps that are distinctly different from those with prescriptive 
legislation. New York State Association of Regional Councils operates in a state with 
enabling legislation, and the map the association displays on its website shows regional 
councils that do not cover the entire state (Figure 3).  
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 Retrieved from Texas Association of Regional Councils website: 
http://www.txregionalcouncil.org/display.php?page=regions_map.php 
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Figure 3. Map of regional councils in New York
26
 
 
 
Unlike states in which the state government defines each region and details the 
area of each COG, planning and development district, or similar regional council 
organization, states with enabling legislation permit local governments to work with 
nearby jurisdictions to create regional councils in the manner they deem appropriate. 
According to New York State Association of Regional Councils, 45 of the state‘s 62 
counties belong to a regional council. 
Forty-four of the fifty states have some type of blanket legislation regarding 
regional councils or regional cooperation. Of those, 17 have enabling legislation (34 
percent of states), while 27 have prescriptive legislation (54 percent of states). I have 
designed this project to illuminate whether these differences in legislation at the state 
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 Retrieved from New York State Association of Regional Councils website: 
http://www.cdrpc.org/nysarc.gif 
29
 
 
level have an influence on the functioning of regional councils. (See Appendix C for a 
table displaying the type of legislation, by state.)  
 
 
Figure 4: Type of blanket state legislation related to regional cooperation 
 
 
Some patterns emerge by region, and this section will detail that landscape 
(Figure 5). In the Northeast region
27
 of the United States, Connecticut was the earliest to 
enact legislation focused on regional coordination, with its 1959 law forming 15 regions. 
Most states in the Northeast passed legislation regarding regional councils in the late 
1960s and into the 1970s. The last to do so was Maine in 1987. The only state in the 
Northeast without a state law regarding regional councils is Rhode Island, presumably on 
account of its small size. In the Northeast the number of state-formed regional councils 
varies from New Jersey‘s single regional planning board, established in 1975, to 
Pennsylvania‘s 96 Councils of Government.  
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I followed the U.S. Census Bureau definitions to categorize the states into four regions: Northeast, South, 
Midwest, and West. 
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Figure 5. Types of legislation by state. Map Credit: Reid Wodicka 
 
 
State laws related to regional councils are also common in the Southern United 
States. All sixteen of the Southern states have blanket legislation pertaining to regional 
councils, with prescriptive legislation being the predominant form in the South. Alabama 
enacted a law in 1935, providing for the establishment of regional councils. Later laws 
further defined the roles of those regional councils, and in 1985 an Alabama state law 
ratified the existing 12 regional planning commissions as the state‘s official regional 
councils
28
.  
Examples of regional councils organized through prescriptive legislation are 
prevalent throughout the Southern states. Texas has 24 regional councils, North Carolina 
has 16, Georgia has 12 regional commissions, South Carolina has ten councils of 
government, Virginia has 21 planning district commissions, Kentucky has 15 area 
development districts, Tennessee has nine development districts, and Louisiana has eight 
regional planning and development districts. Like the Northeast United States, most of 
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 According to the Alabama Archives, see 
http://www.archives.alabama.gov/officials/rdas/local/regplanrda09.pdf 
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the Southern states enacted laws establishing regional councils in the 1960s and early 
1970s. With the exception of Alabama, Delaware is the earliest example within this 
region, with a law passed in 1953. However, because it is a comparatively small state, it 
has just one regional planning commission, which was organized by that legislation
29
.  
Regional councils formed by state legislation are also common in the Midwest 
Census region. Like the South, all of those 12 states have some type of state law 
regarding regional councils. Illinois was the earliest, adopting a law in 1929, the oldest 
such law this research has identified, that allowed for the formation of regional planning 
commissions. Other states followed, with Michigan adopting its Regional Planning Act 
of 1945, and Wisconsin allowing the establishment of regional planning commissions in 
1956. Later adopters in the Midwest are as recent as 1992, when Nebraska established 
eight development districts, and Kansas authorized the establishment of joint planning 
commissions.  
The region of the United States least likely to have legislation establishing or 
enabling the formation of regional councils is the West. I did not identify legislation 
related to regional councils in Montana, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, or Hawaii. While 
Hawaii is likely too small to require much in the way of regional planning, the other 
states are geographically sizable. One possible explanation for the absence of regional 
councils in those states is the size of counties. Counties in the Eastern and Midwestern 
portions of the United States are quite small, while the counties in the Western states are 
much larger by comparison. Counties located in the West might more closely represent 
regions because of their size than the smaller counties of the East, perhaps reducing the 
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32
 
 
perceived necessity of states adding an additional layer of governance through the 
formation of regional councils.  
Though it is challenging to trace the history of regional councils, particularly 
considering many of them were formed decades ago, evidence suggests that at least some 
regional councils were established prior to blanket state legislation establishing or 
enabling them. One such example is the Cowlitz Regional Planning Commission, 
established in Washington state in 1961. After the state passed blanket legislation in 
1965
30
, the commission was reorganized and renamed Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Council of 
Governments.  
2.4: Intended Contributions 
Existing scholarly work tends to mention state laws regarding regional 
governance as a footnote, if at all. Further, the differences between regional councils in 
states with enabling legislation, as opposed to prescriptive legislation, have not been 
explored. Even a basic understanding of what councils of government do, how they are 
structured, and their priorities, is lacking in the literature. Wolf and Bryan (2009) provide 
a broad description of COG capacity, and COG membership has been used as a dummy 
variable in models meant to predict ILA participation by local governments (LeRoux 
2008; LeRoux & Carr 2007; LeRoux, Brandenburg & Pandy 2010), however nothing 
approaching what this study examines has been conducted since Bowman & Franke 
(1984) conducted a survey of regional council directors in 1981.  
This research seeks to provide a broad base of information on regional councils of 
government across the United States. Simple as this goal may be, those data will vastly 
improve the current understanding of this topic. Beyond that basic knowledge, this study 
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contributes to scholarly knowledge by moving beyond descriptive inference to an 
understanding of the role of state laws in shaping regional councils and the particular 
services they offer to their members. This research also provides some insight into the 
perceptions of COG leaders regarding the services they provide. This information is 
valuable to the field of public administration because it improves an understanding of 
attempts to facilitate cooperation in the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability 
and equity, and in terms of urban policy for its implications for flexibility and problem 
solving. This research fits into a broader picture of interlocal cooperation and regional 
governance. Ultimately, this information may be of use to COG staff, local government 
leaders, state and federal level policymakers seeking to promote communication and 
collaboration between jurisdictions, and scholars.  
 The collection of data for this research is, in its own right, a contribution to this 
field of study. A complete list of currently operating regional councils, though a snapshot 
in time, does not exist elsewhere. Likewise, data regarding blanket state laws related to 
regional governance are not readily available. Finally, the data collected from regional 
councils themselves will paint a picture of their operation, on average, that has not been 
clearly drawn in recent years. This study seeks to provide all three of these items in one 
comprehensive attempt to better understand the work of these potentially important 
organizations.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1: Research Questions and Unit of Analysis 
 This project builds upon the existing scholarly literature addressing interlocal 
cooperation and regional governance. Regional councils were identified by Thurmaier 
and Wood (2002) as potentially facilitating the development of cooperative arrangements 
between local government leaders. Since then, membership in a regional council has been 
included as an independent variable in numerous studies examining interlocal agreements 
(for example, LeRoux & Carr 2007; Kwon & Feiock 2010). However, regional councils 
themselves have largely been neglected in terms of scholarly attention in recent years.  
The regional council organization is the unit of analysis in this study. This 
research first seeks to understand the work of regional councils, on average, across the 
United States. Specifically: do these organizations facilitate cooperation among their 
members? And if so, are they involved in both small-scale and large-scale interlocal 
arrangements?  
Further, as state laws either enabled or prescribed the formation of regional 
councils and the manner in which they are organized, this project asks whether the 
differences in blanket state laws (enabling legislation vs. prescriptive legislation) 
influence the behavior of the organization or the perception of the regional council 
director.  
 
 
 
3.2: Data about State Laws 
The presence of enabling legislation or prescriptive legislation, at the state level, 
is the primary independent variable in this study. In my preliminary research, I noticed 
that regional council staff and directors commonly consider their organizations to be 
voluntary, even if the state in which they operate has a prescriptive blanket law requiring 
jurisdictions within specified boundaries to be members of a particular regional council. 
For the sake of accuracy and consistency, I coded each state based on its actual laws, 
rather than relying on the perception of an organization director as to the voluntary or 
mandatory nature of member participation. This process entailed searching for legislation 
within each state related to regional councils, their formation, and requirements for 
participation (see Chapter 2, footnote 20). Once I had a complete list of the type of 
legislation for each state, I merged those codes with the survey data (described in the 
following section) to create a variable for each survey response that indicates the type of 
state legislation under which each organization operates.   
3.3: Survey of Regional Council Directors 
The information provided during the initial scan of regional councils
31
 forms the 
structure upon which this project is built. The next phase involved identifying all of the 
regional councils in the United States and compiling as comprehensive a list as possible, 
in order to administer a survey of the organizations‘ directors. This goal proved 
challenging, as no national organization maintains a list of all regional councils. The 
National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) provides a list of 714 Councils of 
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 I interviewed the Executive Directors of nine regional councils across the United States in 2011. See 
chapter two for more details. 
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Government, Metropolitan Planning Organizations and other regional councils,
32
 which 
was used as the basis for compiling an accurate and current contact list of the directors of 
regional councils operating in the United States. The NARC list was supplemented by 
similar lists from the National Association of Development Organizations (NADO) and 
the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (AMPO). Some of the members 
of the three national organizations are not actually regional councils, but are county 
planning agencies or other local government organizations. Those were excluded from 
the final list, with the exception of those that operate an MPO from within a public 
agency. Regional councils that no longer operate were removed. Additionally, a limited 
number of regional councils that were not included on one of these three organizations‘ 
lists were found through web searches and added to the compiled list. The resulting list 
forms the population of 695 regional councils.  
I administered the survey that provides the data for this analysis to the executive 
directors of the population of regional councils throughout the United States. The reason I 
selected executive directors is to draw upon their expertise regarding the day-to-day work 
of regional councils. Therefore, the sampling frame is the population of executive 
directors of regional council organizations operating in the United States.  
During the fall of 2012, web searches were used to collect email addresses for the 
executive directors of each of the regional councils on my compiled list. The survey tool, 
which was based on information gathered through interviews of executive directors 
conducted the previously year, was refined concurrently.  
The survey asked questions about the leaders‘ perceptions of the willingness of 
local government representatives and other organization members to work together, the 
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 Available on NARC‘s website, http://narc.org/resource-center/cogs-mpos/listing-of-cogs-and-mpos/ 
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types of interlocal agreements they facilitate (if any), the frequency of meetings and 
whether the organizations offer incentives to participate, the presence and structure of 
fees where applicable, and any resistance the directors observe to members working 
together. Refining the exact wording of the questions began in 2011 through the 
preliminary research. Pretesting involved vetting the questions through interviews and 
conversations with individuals working in regional councils. Finally the survey tool was 
piloted with the help of several volunteers from the academic community, local 
government, and regional councils in December, 2012 and January, 2013. The complete 
survey instrument is in Appendix A. 
On January 29, 2013, the UNCC Survey of Regional Council Directors was sent 
electronically to each of the 685 individuals for whom email addresses were available, 
using the web-based survey software Surveyshare. An additional ten paper surveys were 
mailed to regional council directors whose email addresses were not available. In all, 695 
survey invitations were sent. 
3.4: Response Rate 
The survey closed on March 8, 2013, with 197 respondents to the web-based 
survey. One paper survey was completed and returned by U.S. mail. The response rate 
was 28.5 percent, based on the 695 invitations to the population of executive directors. In 
order to provide context to this response rate, I looked to the International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA), which conducts surveys on a regular basis related to 
public administration and local government. The ICMA 2012 State of the Profession 
Survey sent to city and county governments received a response of 24 percent
33
. The
33
http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/305096/ICMA_2012_State_of_the
_Profession_Survey_Results 
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ICMA Police and Fire Personnel, Salaries, and Expenditures, 2012 survey, sent to city-
type local governments with 10,000 or greater population, received responses from 35 
percent
34
. The Local Government Employee Health Insurance Programs, 2011,
administered to municipalities and counties over 10,000 population, had a response rate 
for cities of 30 percent and for counties 20 percent, with an overall response rate of 26 
percent
35
. The response rate for this study of 28.5 percent is within the expected range for
surveys with similar target respondents conducted by a well respected organization. 
3.5: Non-Response Bias 
The primary independent variable is the type of state legislation, with three 
possible alternatives: no legislation
36
, enabling legislation, or prescriptive legislation.
While compiling the list of regional council directors and their contact information, I also 
collected information on the state in which each regional council operates. This allowed 
me to examine the population of regional councils, and the percentage of the population 
governed by each type of state legislation. I then compared this to the sample, and the 
percentage of each type of state legislation for those who responded, to ensure that no 
significant difference exists between the population and the survey sample, based on the 
primary independent variable. (See Figure 6.) Because I did not have data for the 
population on the values for dependent variables of the models tested in the analyses 
outlined in the remainder of this chapter, I could not conduct a similar check of 
dependent variables. 
34
http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/304841/ICMA_2012_Police_and_
Fire_Personnel_and_Expenditures_Survey_Summary 
35
http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/303133/ICMA_2011_Local_Gove
rnment_Employee_Health_Care_Survey_Summary_Results 
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 Only three organizations responding to the survey operate in states with no blanket legislation regarding 
regional councils. Therefore, only the type of legislation—either enabling or prescriptive—was examined 
during the statistical analysis of the survey data. 
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 Figure 6. Comparison of population to sample for potential response bias 
  
 
 One percent of the regional council organizations in the United States operate in 
states with no identifiable legislation related to regional councils. The percentage of 
organizations in the survey sample is the same. Organizations in states with enabling 
legislation make up approximately 37% of the population, while comprising 34% of the 
sample. The remaining 62% of organizations in the population operate in states with 
prescriptive legislation; in the sample, organizations under prescriptive legislation 
comprise 65%. Further analysis using a one-sample t-test revealed that these differences 
are not statistically significant. This methodology aligns with the recommendations of 
Bryman & Cramer (2009); Sorensen (2006); and Columbia CNMTL (2002). 
3.6: Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical concepts related to regional government and governance, 
this research tests the following hypotheses. In addition to listing the hypotheses, the 
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causal mechanisms and the questions used to operationalize each variable are discussed 
in this section.  
H1: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are more likely to 
foster frequent face-to-face interaction between leaders in member jurisdictions, than 
those in states with enabling legislation. 
 The frequency of interaction between local leaders is used as a proxy for working 
together. This assumes that leaders from different jurisdictions that have a culture of 
meeting together on a regular basis are forging relationships, a shared sense of purpose, 
and the trust required to work together on issues that affect more than one jurisdiction 
(Thurmaier & Wood 2002). Research has indicated that face-to-face interaction is a 
precursor for substantive cooperation such as interlocal agreements (Wood, 2006; 
LeRoux, Brandenburger and Pandey 2010). This face-to-face interaction should logically 
lead to the building of trust and therefore cooperation. Does one type of blanket state law 
more effectively generate interaction between regional council members? The Olson 
philosophy would support this hypothesis, as ―coercion‖ would be seen as necessary in 
order to overcome the resistance to collective action in large groups. Elinor Ostrom 
would argue that it is possible to achieve collective action without state coercion, but 
only under specific circumstances. Therefore, I have stated the first hypothesis with the 
theoretical expectation that prescriptive legislation from the state will positively influence 
the frequency of interaction between regional council members. Two different survey 
questions asked respondents about the frequency of meeting—one that is purely objective 
and another that reflects the perception of executive directors.  
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 The survey asked respondents, ―How often does your organization hold meetings 
at which members meet in person?‖ The response choices included never, annually, 
quarterly, monthly, and weekly. These responses form a categorical dependent variable, 
which will serve as the dependent variable in an ordinal logistic regression model, with 
the following codes: never = 0; annually = 1; quarterly = 2; bimonthly (anything between 
monthly and quarterly) = 3; monthly = 4; and weekly =5.  
 In addition to the primary analysis, data were collected regarding whether or not 
incentives are offered to members for attending formal meetings, and whether 
disincentives or consequences exist for members who do not attend. These data allow for 
supplemental descriptive analysis.  
 Directors were also asked to rate this statement on a scale of one to ten (with one 
meaning ―do not agree‖ and ten meaning ―strongly agree‖): ―This organization is able to 
effectively facilitate face-to-face interactions between leaders in member jurisdictions.‖ 
This provides additional analysis, from the perspective of directors, regarding the 
effectiveness of face-to-face interactions among members, and allows for triangulation 
with the first question regarding meeting frequency. These responses provide the data for 
the dependent variable of a second ordinal logistic regression model.  
H2: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are more likely to 
assist member jurisdictions in the development of interlocal agreements, than those in 
states with enabling legislation.  
 Does the type of state legislation have an influence on whether or not regional 
councils play a role in the development of ILAs? Depending on which theoretical 
perspective is embraced, one could expect either a greater or lesser degree of involvement 
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on the part of regional councils, based on the type of blanket state law. For the purpose of 
this study, I have stated the hypothesis with the expectation that prescriptive legislation 
increases the likelihood of regional councils being involved with interlocal agreements, 
building on the causal mechanism outlined above in regard to the first hypothesis. If we 
assume that regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are likely to meet 
more frequently than those in states with enabling legislation, we might further expect 
those organizations to be more likely to facilitate formal interlocal agreements among 
their members.   
 Executive directors responded to the question, ―Does your organization assist 
member jurisdictions with forming, implementing and/or maintaining interlocal 
agreements?‖ The dichotomous responses will form the dependent variable in logistic 
regression analysis. Respondents were also encouraged to provide any details they 
wished to share in an open-ended response, which is the basis for supplemental 
qualitative analysis.  
H3: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are more likely to 
report large-scale interlocal agreements, than those in states with enabling legislation.  
 Respondents were also asked about the number of jurisdictions that participate in 
the ―typical‖ interlocal agreement among their members. According to LeRoux (2008), 
adjacent borders are a statistically significant predictor of whether jurisdictions engage in 
interlocal cooperation for service delivery. Based on that earlier finding, I anticipate that 
much of the interlocal cooperation reported by regional councils involves only a small 
number of jurisdictions, rather than being truly regional in nature
37
. This hypothesis seeks 
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 Transportation is a possible exception to this expectation, as MPOs are specifically designed to 
coordinate regional transportation planning, with incentives tied to federal funding. 
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to further examine whether state legislation influences the scale of interlocal agreements 
brokered through regional councils. 
 The responses to this question will form the dependent variable in an ordinal 
logistic regression model. Rather than require respondents to guess at an exact number as 
an average, and anticipating that would reduce the number of valid responses received, I 
provided ranges from which respondents could select. The coding of the variable is as 
follows: 1 to 3 = 1; 4 to 6 = 2; 7 to 10 = 3; 10 to 14 = 4; 15 to 19 = 5; 20 to 24 = 6; 25 to 
29 = 7; 30 or more = 8.  
H4: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are more likely (than 
those in states with enabling legislation) to report cooperative attitudes among members.   
 Substantive cooperation must be preceded by a willingness to cooperate. Research 
has established that trust, or the presence of cooperative norms, is a precondition for the 
development of interjurisdictional cooperation (Cigler 1999; Thurmaier & Wood 2002; 
Wood 2006; LeRoux, Brandenburger, & Pandey 2010; Feiock 2005; Olberding 2002). 
The fourth hypothesis is stated in this manner with the assumption that prescriptive 
legislation leads to a ―culture‖ of cooperation. This is, in part, related to the causal 
mechanism described with the first hypothesis. Those organizations in which members 
are required to interact with fellow members may, over time, develop a culture of shared 
norms and cooperative attitudes.  
The survey sought two responses to provide data for this analysis. Both are 
statements with a one-to-ten scale of agreement (where one means ―do not agree‖ and ten 
equals ―strongly agree‖): ―Members in this organization believe that working together 
can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes,‖ and ―Members in this organization have 
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competitive attitudes or rivalries that get in the way of working together.‖ The first is a 
positive statement that indicates cooperative attitudes; the second is stated in the reverse 
with competition representing an impediment to cooperation. The responses form the 
dependent variables for two separate models to be tested using ordinal logistic regression.  
3.7: Additional Variables 
            Regional councils that have a long history of operation will likely have developed 
a culture of shared interests, in which trust and norms of cooperation have emerged 
(Thurmaier & Wood 2002). Though conflict is a reality in any attempt at cooperation, the 
resolution of conflict, and the ability to weather disagreements, is a characteristic that is 
likely to develop in councils with a lengthy history of working together. The length of 
time a regional council has been in existence will be a control variable in the models used 
to test these hypotheses. This variable is reported by executive directors in their survey 
responses.  
A metropolitan planning organization is a distinct type of regional council (Vogel 
& Nezelkewicz 2002; Giuliano 2004; Leland & Whisman 2012). Therefore it is treated 
differently in the analyses. A dichotomous variable with a ―one‖ for organizations that 
are MPOs or include MPOs within their structure, and a ―zero‖ for all others, is included 
in the models employed to test the hypotheses. This information was collected via the 
survey.  
The number of members in each organization is an independent variable in the 
analyses. This variable controls for any differences between organizations that attempt to 
coordinate large numbers of jurisdictions and those that have just a few jurisdictions with 
which to work. Olson (1965) made the case that large organizations can lead to free 
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riders, providing justification for including this variable. The executive director of each 
regional council reported the number of members in his or her organization, providing a 
continuous control variable.  
In the models that examine interlocal agreements, two additional variables are 
added: one that measures population increase or decline, and another that represents 
economic growth or decline. LeRoux & Carr (2007) identified that fiscal strain, which 
could be associated with economic conditions or rapid population change, can lead local 
governments to consider interlocal agreements as an alternative method of service 
delivery. Kwon & Feiock (2010) found the same was true for population decline within a 
jurisdiction. Therefore, both variables are included in this study‘s models related to 
interlocal agreements. Because regions are not coterminous with other well-defined 
boundaries, such as cities or counties, which could be assessed using Census data, 
executive directors provided this data through their survey responses. These are objective 
measures, with which the director of a regional council should be familiar, so there is 
little concern that a respondent would seek to inflate, deflate or otherwise falsely report 
these values. 
3.8: Limitations 
As with any research endeavor, limitations and challenges exist. Perhaps the most 
daunting is the sheer scope of research questions related to regional governance and the 
limited slice of those larger questions that this research will be able to illuminate. I have 
already addressed another concern earlier in this chapter with the discussion of non-
response bias, which I have satisfactorily ruled out.  
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More substantively, this research design relies, in part, on perception to examine 
the work of regional councils. Most of the survey questions are of a purely factual nature. 
However, by administering the survey to directors of regional councils, this study relies 
partly on the perceptions of those individuals who respond. There may be a tendency on 
the part of some directors to inflate the value of their work in the broader community. 
Andrews (1984) cautions that researchers be aware of bias in survey measures: ―…while 
bias can produce serious distortions in percentages, means, and other measures of central 
tendency, and hence is a threat that must always be considered, a bias that is constant for 
all respondents does not affect linear relationships at either the bivariate or multivariate 
level,‖ (410). Given the similar nature of work among directors, I must apply the 
assumption that any bias will be fairly consistent in the few questions that rely on 
directors‘ perception.  
Because no one knows the regional council business better than the organizations‘ 
directors themselves, their perceptions and experiences are valuable to this research. 
Through carefully wording the survey, I attempted to mitigate my concern about bias. I 
have followed the advice of Patten (1998) when using attitude scales to write some 
statements favorably and others unfavorably. Most of the questions are objective, and for 
those that are of a subjective nature, I have worded them thoughtfully and treat the 
responses with the appropriate measure of caution.  
Unit of analysis introduces an additional concern to this research. For some 
measures, directors were asked to consider the region as a whole in their responses. Two 
examples are provided by the economic wellbeing of the region and population change 
(growth or decline). These questions could be difficult to answer if some jurisdictions 
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within a region are growing—either economically or in terms of population—while 
others are experiencing decline. Additionally, most of the literature that guided the design 
of this project used the individual jurisdiction as the unit of analysis. This is only a 
concern in the sense that the researcher must be mindful when drawing connections to the 
results of prior studies. I have been careful to note where this occurs, to ensure any 
comparisons to the findings of other studies are valid and not misleading.  
Finally, this study was only able to reach the directors of formal regional council 
organizations. Other associations between local government leaders exist, and might 
result in interlocal cooperation of a different nature and scope. The current research 
regrettably only reaches formal organizations, thereby not taking into account the work of 
less formal, more grassroots regional associations.  
The previous work related to interlocal cooperation, as one aspect of regional 
governance, has largely focused on a single state or a single metropolitan area [for 
example, Gordon (2007) studied 14 counties in Central Illinois; LeRoux & Carr (2007) 
examined local governments in the state of Michigan; LeRoux (2008) utilized the 7-
county Detroit MSA; Vogel & Nezelkewicz (2002) studied the area served by 
Louisville‘s MPO; and Thurmaier & Wood (2002) examined the Kansas City 
metropolitan area]. This research has the advantage of generalizability, because it 
examines the work of regional councils throughout the United States. Therefore, it seeks 
to make a substantive contribution to the development of regional governance theory as it 
pertains to regional councils.  
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
 
Participants in the Survey of Regional Council Directors provided an abundance 
of information regarding the functioning of councils of government and similar 
organizations across the United States. This is the first national study that focuses 
specifically on regional councils and attempts to generalize the findings to the population 
since Bowman & Franke (1984) conducted a survey of regional councils in 1981. The 
experience shared by the executive directors of regional councils forms the fabric from 
which these findings are constructed. 
4.1: Organizational Characteristics 
 Regional councils bear a variety of names, the most common of which is Council 
of Governments (COG). Regional Commission, Regional Planning Commission, 
Regional Planning Agency, Regional Planning Organization, Economic Development 
District, Regional Development Commission, and Association of Governments are some 
other names given to regional councils.  
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are a special type of regional 
council (see the previous discussion of MPOs, beginning in Chapter 1). Their primary 
purpose is the regional coordination of transportation planning; their existence is 
legislated by the federal government and is necessary for the channeling of federal funds 
to transportation projects in urbanized areas
38
. Many MPOs are housed within regional 
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 MPOs were originally organized by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962. 
councils with broader purposes, which Leland & Whisman (2012) labeled SuperCOGs. 
Some MPOs are physically housed within local government offices, such as a county 
planning department, though their staff members are typically independent from the local 
government. 
The organizations represented by the survey were categorized by their executive 
directors as COGs, MPOs, or both. Approximately 55 percent of the organizations are 
COGs (or similar organizations); roughly 21 percent are MPOs; about 24 percent are 
SuperCOGs. 
Figure 7: Type of regional council (n=195) 
4.2: Formation of Organizations 
Many of the organizations in this study came into existence during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. This is not the least bit surprising, given the many laws related to 
regional governance that were passed during that time. These laws included the 
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Intergovernmental Cooperation Act at the federal level, and numerous blanket laws at the 
state level authorizing regional councils
39
. Approximately 61 percent of the organizations
included in the survey trace their origins back to the years between 1965 and 1975. Those 
regional council organizations have decades of experience working together. 
Figure 8: Formation of regional councils (n=194) 
4.3: Members 
Members of regional councils typically include a combination of local 
governments such as counties and municipalities. In some cases regional council 
members also include local Native American tribes, nonprofit organizations, local 
Chambers of Commerce, and occasionally states. Local governments that are regional 
council members are typically represented on the councils by their elected or appointed 
officials. In fact 95 percent of respondents noted local government elected officials, such 
as mayors and city or county council members, were active in their organizations. Fifty-
39
 Appendix C contains a table displaying the legislation related to regional councils and regional 
cooperation in 44 states. 
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two percent responded that local appointed officials, such as city managers, county 
managers, or town managers, were involved in representing member jurisdictions.
40
Additionally, about 11 percent of survey participants responded that tribal leaders 
represent their tribes as members of the organizations. 
When asked whether their members included representation from the private 
sector or business community, about 55 percent responded affirmatively
41
. The most
common other response was that individual private citizens represent their communities 
on the regional councils (in about 11 percent of responses). In a handful of cases, other 
members were involved, including representatives from universities and school systems 
and representatives from transit agencies. 
4.4: Number of Members 
The number of members in regional council organizations varies widely, from 
three members to 295 members (Figure 9). The mean number of members reported by the 
participating organizations is 37. Not surprisingly, the number of members in a regional 
council has a statistically significant, positive correlation with both the area (in square 
miles) which an organization serves and the population of the region served. 
40
 All but three of those also had elected officials representing the organizations‘ member jurisdictions. 
Those include a COG in New Hampshire and two in Vermont. 
41
 This question was posed twice on the survey. Respondents were asked whether their membership 
included members from the private sector. They were also asked whether their members included business 
leaders from the community. These two responses were highly correlated, indicating respondents 
understood both questions to be measuring the presence of non-governmental members on their regional 
councils.  
52
Figure 9: Number of members (n=191) 
4.5: Area and Population Served 
The area in square miles served by these organizations varies from quite small 
regions of less than 100 square miles to regions representing 20,000 square miles or 
larger (Figure 10). The most common area reported by respondents is between 1,000 and 
4,999 square miles, with 67 directors selecting this category. Sixty-one percent of 
participating organizations fit into the area between 500 square miles and 9,999 square 
miles (represented by three mid-range categories on the survey). 
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Figure 10: Area served by regional councils (n=187) 
 
 The population served by regional council organizations varies from less than 
50,000 to over five million (Figure 11). The most common response was between 
100,000 to 499,999, with 54 percent of respondents selecting that category.  
 
 
Figure 11: Population served by regional councils (n=191) 
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4.6: Types of Work 
 This question was based on the preliminary research I conducted regarding 
regional councils, including interviews with regional council directors in 2011. While the 
types of work addressed by regional councils varies widely, these options represent the 
most common types of work reported in that preliminary research. Nearly all of the 
participating organizations noted that they have some involvement in transportation 
planning, even those that are not MPOs (Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12: Types of work performed by regional councils (n=194) 
 
 
4.7: Most Important Offering 
 Directors responded to the question, ―What do you consider to be the most 
important service your organization offers to its members?‖ Understanding that regional 
councils perform many tasks, this question was intended to gauge the director‘s sense of 
what is the most valuable service his or her organization provides to the region in which 
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they operate (Figure 13). While some directors provided a laundry list of activities, and 
one even copied and pasted the organization‘s mission into the response, most provided a 
single response
42
. Responses included technical assistance, transportation-related 
functions, economic development, planning, and others
43
. Twenty-nine percent of 
respondents regard technical assistance to member jurisdictions to be the most important 
service they offer. Of those that elaborated, assistance with grant writing was the most 
common, followed by research and subject matter expertise (such as GIS assistance, 
project management, zoning, IT, historic preservation, or stormwater management). 
 
 
Figure 13: Most important work according to regional council directors (n=178) 
 
 Following closely behind technical assistance were responses related to 
transportation planning. This is not surprising, given that roughly 45 percent of the 
organizations surveyed are MPOs or include an MPO in their structure. Several of these 
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 I focused on the first response in cases where multiple responses were provided.  
43
 One director of an organization operating in South Carolina responded, ―That‘s a loaded question.‖ 
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responses mentioned transportation funding. Only two of them specifically indicated 
involvement in public transit or ―alternative‖ modes of transportation.  
 Despite the fact that researchers have focused on the role of regional councils in 
facilitating interaction between member jurisdictions within a region (Thurmaier & Wood 
2002), only sixteen percent of respondents cited this as their organization‘s most 
important work. The word ―forum‖ appeared repeatedly in these responses, along with 
―networking,‖ ―linking,‖ ―connecting,‖ and ―communication.‖ One director replied that 
his organization, which operates in Virginia, is a ―neutral forum for dispute resolution,‖ 
indicating that some level of contention exists between jurisdictions attempting to 
function as a region. Another director referred to his North Carolina organization as 
providing ―impartial problem solving and collaboration.‖ Others mentioned consensus 
building, and one indicated that through collaboration, cost savings is quickly becoming 
the primary focus of his New England organization‘s members.  
 The next most common response was planning. This category is distinct from the 
transportation planning response, as it pertains to comprehensive or strategic planning 
with member jurisdictions. This response represents twelve percent of participating 
directors.  
 Economic development was cited by roughly eight percent of directors as being 
their foremost function. Water quality and environmental sustainability issues were the 
primary focus of only four directors, as was aging services. One director of an Alabama 
organization mentioned ―public involvement guidance‖ as the primary focus of his 
organization.  
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Finally, one director of an organization in the state of Washington responded that 
his organization works primarily on the ―recognition of the nexus of land 
use/transportation planning with economic development.‖ This response stands out 
among the others as transcending localized thinking with a focus on the interrelated 
nature of land use and transportation, and their associated outcomes.  
4.8: Economic Conditions 
 Directors were asked to gauge the economic condition of their regions over the 
past three years, and to offer their prediction of their regional economy during the next 
three years (Figure 14). Options were framed as either growth or decline (slow, moderate, 
or rapid), or stable, meaning no growth or decline.  In terms of the prior three years, 27 
percent of directors indicated a stable economic base. Thirty-three percent noted 
economic decline, whether slow, moderate, or rapid, while 23 percent responded that 
there had been slow economic growth. Thirteen percent selected moderate growth and 
only four percent experienced rapid growth.  
 
 
Figure 14: Recent economic climate (n=194) 
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 Directors were on the whole much more optimistic about the next three years 
(Figure 15). This may signal that as the recession wanes, along with its effects on 
communities, leaders foresee a time of improving economic conditions. In looking to the 
future, not a single director selected rapid economic decline, whereas six (three percent) 
had described the previous three years in that manner. Only four percent of directors 
predict economic decline of any severity in their regions in the near future. Sixteen 
percent expect the economic conditions to remain stable. Fully 84 percent believe the 
economy of the region they serve will grow over the next few years. Some amount of 
optimism could account for these responses, although it is likely the positions these 
individuals hold provide them with a certain amount of insight into economic 
development efforts currently underway.  
 
Figure 15: Expected economic climate (n=194) 
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4.9: State Laws  
 This research hinges on the presence of blanket legislation at the state level, 
which either enables or prescribes the work of regional councils. As discussed in chapter 
three, the organizations in the survey sample closely reflect the organizations across the 
United States, in terms of the percentages of each under the two types of legislation, as 
well as without any blanket state legislation. Approximately 34 percent of organizations 
in this sample are in states with enabling legislation, 65 percent are governed by 
prescriptive legislation, and the remaining one percent of organizations operate in states 
that do not have blanket legislation in regard to regional councils (Figure 16).   
 
 
Figure 16: State legislation governing organizations in the survey sample (n=193)  
 
 
The models used to test this study‘s hypotheses operationalize the type of state 
law as either enabling legislation or prescriptive legislation. Since only one percent of the 
sample (representing two organizations) operate in states with no identifiable blanket 
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legislation, any substantive results to emerge regarding the significance of no legislation 
are unlikely. Those two organizations are coded as ―missing‖ on the independent variable 
for type of legislation
44
.  
Despite the fact that most respondents to the survey operate within states 
governed by prescriptive legislation, the vast majority of directors answered that their 
organizations‘ members join voluntarily (Figure 17). This is somewhat surprising, given 
that the type of state legislation in the majority of states, and governing the majority of 
regional councils, is prescriptive legislation. I noticed this phenomenon when conducting 
preliminary research. Even in states in which I knew the legislation outlined the 
boundaries of a ―region,‖ and required jurisdictions within each region to belong to a 
particular regional council, staff at regional councils told me membership in their 
organizations was ―voluntary.‖ For this reason, I knew I could not simply ask whether 
organizations were mandatory or voluntary on the survey, but instead conducted in-depth 
research into the state laws in each state and coded regional councils as being governed 
by either prescriptive or enabling legislation based on the state(s) in which they operate.  
There is a statistically significant bivariate correlation between the type of state 
legislation within which an organization operates and the director‘s perception of whether 
his or her organizations‘ members join voluntary. Those in states with prescriptive 
legislation are more likely to respond that their members are required to belong to the 
council. However, the coefficient is quite low (.174, with a significance level of .042). 
                                            
44
 I also ran each of the models, which are described in greater detail throughout the remainder of this 
chapter, with the three types of legislation coded as dummy variables. In none of those models was the ―no 
legislation‖ variable statistically significant. Furthermore, all of the other variables in the models remained 
unchanged in terms of whether or not they were significant and the direction of their influence. This, 
combined with the lack of substantive meaning in regard to states without blanket legislation related to 
regional councils, support the validity of structuring the models as they appear in this chapter.  
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Figure 17: Voluntary membership (n=188) 
 
 
Some possible explanations exist for this mismatch between governing legislation 
and the responses of regional council directors to this question. A lack of clarity on the 
part of regional council directors regarding the details of state legislation is perhaps the 
simplest explanation. It is also possible that sanctions are not in place for jurisdictions 
that do not wish to participate in regional council activities, or that sanctions, if in place, 
are not enforced. This finding might alternately suggest that such a culture exists within 
regional councils that most jurisdictions within a regional council‘s boundaries choose to 
participate; therefore directors in states with prescriptive legislation are not faced with 
what to do in the case of non-participating jurisdictions. If this is the case, such a culture 
may be due to the fact that state legislation has, in most states, been on the books for four 
decades or longer—long enough for regional councils to establish their value in the eyes 
of potential participants. Finally, regional council directors might simply find it more 
palatable to consider their organizations voluntary associations, though the actual 
conditions set forth by the state in which they operate might be more heavy-handed.  
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Further research into this anomaly would be required in order to arrive confidently at a 
conclusion.  
4.10: Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 is stated: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are 
more likely to foster frequent face-to-face interaction between leaders in member 
jurisdictions, than those in states with enabling legislation. Because research has 
indicated that face-to-face interaction between local leaders is a precursor to developing 
cooperation (Thurmaier & Wood 2002; Wood, 2006; LeRoux, Brandenburger and 
Pandey 2010), often observed through the presence of interlocal agreements, this study 
examines the role of regional councils in facilitating face-to-face meetings and the role 
state laws might play in predicting the behavior of regional councils in this regard. The 
most common response, by far, to the survey question gauging the frequency of meetings 
among regional council members is monthly (Figure 18).  
 
 
Figure 18: Frequency of face-to-face meetings (n=186) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Never Annually Quarterly Between
Quarterly &
Monthly
Monthly Weekly
Frequency of Face-to-Face Meetings 
63
 
 
 The frequency of meeting responses form an ordinal dependent variable, therefore 
in order to test whether the different type of state laws influence how frequently regional 
councils hold member meetings, I utilized an ordered regression model (Long & Freese, 
2006).
45
 In addition to the type of state law, variables in the model include the number of 
years the regional council has operated, the number of members in the council, a 
dichotomous variable representing whether or not the regional council includes an MPO, 
and control variables for the executive director‘s level of education and length of time 
with the organization.  
 
Table 1: Model for frequency of meetings 
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State Law 
0.303 0.37 
(0.338) 
 Years in 
Operation** 
0.030 0.02 
(0.013) 
 
MPO (dummy)* 
0.603 0.06 
(0.323) 
 Number of 
Members 
-0.002 0.45 
(0.003) 
 
Director's Tenure** 
-0.036 0.03 
(0.017) 
 
Director's Education 
-0.039 0.87 
(0.230) 
 n = 173 
Pseudo R
2
 = .034 
LR Chi
2
 = 12.19 
Prob > chi
2
  = 0.058 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
                                            
45
 After estimating the model, I attempted to run the Brant test to rule out the possibility that any of the 
variables in the model violate the parallel regression assumption. I was unable to run the test, however the 
results for the primary independent variable were consistent when I used multinomial rather than ordinal 
logistic regression. Because the dependent variable is indeed ordered (from least frequent meeting to most 
frequent), I selected the more simply interpreted ordered model.  
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 Based on this model, the type of state law (prescriptive vs. enabling) does not 
have a statistically significant influence on the frequency with which regional councils 
facilitate meetings among their members. In other words, I am unable to reject the null 
hypothesis—that there is no difference between state enabling legislation and prescriptive 
legislation in influencing meeting frequency. Variables that do have an influence on the 
frequency of meeting include the number of years the organization has been in operation, 
as well as whether or not the organization is an MPO or includes an MPO in its structure. 
The length of time an organization has existed is positively related to meeting frequency. 
This could be due to a culture of interaction that develops over time, becoming stronger 
as an organization ages and its members become accustomed to working together. 
Having an MPO in the regional council is also positively associated with the frequency of 
face-to-face meetings among members. This could be an indication that transportation-
related projects require more frequent meetings, or that regional organizations tasked 
with transportation issues are more likely to recognize the importance of meeting 
regularly with their members. Frequent meetings could also be the result of the deadlines 
that are tied to the receipt of grant money. 
 Meeting frequency is one of two ways I attempted to gauge the face-to-face 
interactions of each organization‘s members. An additional survey item was designed to 
gauge the director‘s perception of his or her organization‘s effectiveness at facilitating 
face-to-face interactions between member jurisdictions
46
. Thurmaier and Wood (2002) 
advanced the idea that cooperation between local governments can develop due to 
                                            
46
 A correlation does not exist between the measures of meeting frequency and effectiveness of facilitating 
face-to-face meetings. This could mean that simply conducting meetings is not the same as being effective 
at bringing members together. Though this finding is outside the scope of this project, it bears mentioning, 
and perhaps further investigation. It could also indicate that organization leaders are working to bring 
together member jurisdictions outside of formal meetings.  
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interactions taking place as a result of participation in a regional council. The perception 
of how well regional councils perform this function provides a second dependent variable 
to test the first hypothesis (Figure 19). 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Director perception of effective face-to-face meetings (n=193) 
 
 
 Not surprisingly, executive directors of regional councils are much more likely to 
assert that they are effective in facilitating face-to-face interactions among their members, 
than to admit that they are ineffective in doing so
47
. Approximately 40 percent of 
respondents selected ―strongly agree‖ (or ten on a scale of one to ten, where one means 
                                            
47
 Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 3 of the limitations related to perception bias. Andrews (1984) 
indicates that this type of bias, if consistent, will not be problematic for the estimation of this model. 
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―do not agree‖ and ten means ―strongly agree‖) in response to this question
48
. Only 12 
percent of respondents selected a ―seven‖ or below.  
 When examining the effectiveness of facilitating interactions, rather than the 
frequency of meeting, the type of state law is a statistically significant independent 
variable (Table 2). Executive directors of organizations operating in states with 
prescriptive legislation, rather than enabling legislation, are more likely to respond that 
their organizations effectively facilitate face-to-face interaction between their members. 
This is consistent with the first hypothesis, though only in terms of perceived 
effectiveness and not frequency of meeting. This finding supports the Olson theory of 
collective action, as discussed in chapter one. In working toward the common interests of 
members in a large group, the sanctions applied through prescriptive legislation appear to 
reduce the likelihood of free riders and allow directors to feel that they are more effective 
in their efforts. It would suggest that directors of regional councils in states with 
prescriptive legislation perceive that they have the support of the state in operating their 
organizations, and are therefore effective at facilitating the sort of interactions that are 
intended to result in cooperation between jurisdictions.  
However, this analysis is not sufficient to conclude that a prescriptive type of state 
law singlehandedly generates effectiveness. Because we are relying on the perception of 
the executive directors to report this dependent variable, I think we should interpret this 
result with a grain of salt. It is simply an indication that when a state requires 
                                            
48
 When using ordered logistic regression models, having a skewed dependent variable is not a concern. I 
did attempt to standardize participants‘ responses to questions that address perception of effectiveness, and 
run an OLS model with the standardized dependent variable. However, perhaps due to the fact that there 
were only three such variables on the survey, the models using standardized dependent variables were not 
statistically significant. Therefore, I stayed with the ordered logistical regression model.  
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jurisdictions within a particular region to participate in a regional council, the directors of 
those councils feel they are better able to facilitate interactions between their members.  
 
Table 2: Model for effective meetings  
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State 
Law** 
0.648 0.03 
(0.302) 
 
Years in Operation 
0.005 0.62 
(0.011) 
 
MPO (dummy) 
-0.345 0.22 
(0.282) 
 Number of 
Members 
0.000 0.92 
(0.003) 
 
Director's Tenure 
0.012 0.39 
(0.014) 
 Director's 
Education*** 
-0.595 0.01 
(0.216)   
n = 179 
Pseudo R
2
 = .026 
LR Chi
2
 = 15.13 
Prob > chi
2
  = 0.019 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
Just as regional councils vary widely in other characteristics, their policies toward 
meetings also vary. Some regional councils require members to attend meetings, others 
do not. Some directors used the word ―encouraged‖ to describe their meeting policy. 
Others simply mentioned that a quorum is required in order to conduct business. One 
director, of an organization from Arkansas, indicated that attendance at meetings is not 
required, but that ―it is hard to get a quorum sometimes.‖ Another, from a regional 
council in Virginia, replied that meeting attendance is not mandatory, but that 
―attendance is almost always excellent.‖  
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When asked whether they provide incentives for attending meetings, 66 percent 
responded that they do not (Figure 20). Of the 34 percent of organizations that do 
incentivize meeting attendance, food is a common incentive. The food response ranges 
from snacks or pizza to a full, hot meal. Mileage reimbursement and covering the cost of 
travel were also common responses. One organization from Virginia provides a $35 
stipend for attendance. Another, from California, offers a $100 stipend to encourage 
members to attend. Within this range, two directors of organizations from Minnesota 
noted they provide $50 per diem plus expenses or travel for attending, and an 
organization from New Mexico offers $75 to help cover travel and lodging.  
 
 
Figure 20: Incentives for meeting attendance (n=193) 
 
 
The topics of the meetings themselves were counted as an incentive by some 
directors. Training and information about upcoming projects or available funding were in 
this category. Some directors offered humorous responses, such as ―our smiling faces‖ or 
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―I am very charming‖ when asked about incentives for attendance. One mentioned 
―Vermont artisan cheese and pepperoni‖ as his organization‘s incentives. Others simply 
mentioned they did not perceive a need to provide incentives.  
One MPO director from Florida admitted that, ―Members are motivated by 
funding.‖ This director elaborates, however, the belief that members primarily 
―participate because they recognize the importance of transportation planning and its 
influence on the economy.‖  
The survey also asked directors whether there were consequences for members or 
their representatives who fail to attend meetings (Figure 21). Only about 25 percent 
responded that members face any formal sanctions for not attending. The responses 
occasionally varied based on whether it referred to the representatives of members or to 
executive board members of the regional councils, where such a distinction exists.  
 
 
Figure 21: Consequences for not attending meetings (n=193) 
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Some organizations indicated that if more than a set number of meetings are 
missed, action is taken. For example, one organization notifies the local government of 
the poor attendance and provides suggestions for improvement. Others ask for the 
appointing body (such as a local government) to replace its representative if that person 
fails to attend meetings as expected. Others still remove voting privileges from those 
members who do not meet attendance requirements.  
One director of an organization from South Dakota replied that sanctions exist, 
but are rarely enforced because it would likely mean the loss of a dues-paying member, 
upon whom the organization relies for its continued existence. Some indicated that 
missing a meeting could mean not getting to weigh in or vote on an issue of concern to 
the entire region, and their members respond to this concern by being present. For 
example, a COG director from West Virginia noted that, ―Other than the typical loss of 
the networking, presentations, and knowledge gained through participation, a member 
could miss knowing of an approaching grant opportunity or deadline‖ if they fail to 
attend meetings.  
A director from New York replied that, ―A rolling quorum has been considered 
but never adopted.‖ A COG director from Texas wrote, ―Bylaws allow removal for 3+ 
missed meetings, but it is not enforced.‖ Another Texas-based director replied that, ―Four 
absences causes a member to lose their slot on the board; however, they can appeal to the 
board to stay on. The appeal has only happened twice; both times they were allowed to 
stay on.‖  
Some of the responses to the question about disincentives border on the absurd. A 
SuperCOG director from Utah wrote that members who do not attend meetings regularly 
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are subject to ―teasing from other officials.‖ A Connecticut MPO director wrote, ―if a 
member misses three consecutive meetings, we write asking them about their interest in 
continuing on our board.‖ 
These responses confirm what Visser (2004) observed when he wrote that 
regional councils are ―‗weak‘ examples of new regionalism‖ (61), and Wolf and Bryan 
(2009) confirmed when describing regional councils as ―relatively weak and ineffective‖ 
(61). The ability of regional council organizations to generate the participation of 
member jurisdictions is mixed, at best.  
4.11: Hypothesis 2  
 
Hypothesis 2 is stated: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are 
more likely to assist member jurisdictions in the development of interlocal agreements, 
than those in states with enabling legislation. The literature on regional governance has 
focused on the measureable output of interlocal agreements (ILAs) as a way to examine 
cooperation between jurisdictions. Membership in a regional council has been considered 
one of the factors predicting whether local governments engage in ILAs (beginning with 
Thurmaier & Wood 2002). What influence do regional councils themselves have on the 
development of ILAs?  
 Respondents from 61% of the regional councils surveyed are involved in 
interlocal agreements (Figure 22). Many of the organizations work on ILAs related to 
transportation. Mutual aid and emergency communication (interoperability) are 
frequently cited, as are joint purchasing arrangements, HAZMAT, disaster preparedness, 
water and sewer, solid waste, economic development, services for the aging and other 
healthcare related services, transit, trail development, and GIS services. Only five 
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organizations specifically mentioned environmental protection, conservation, or 
restoration (such as air quality related work) in their list of interlocal agreement activities. 
One organization was working on a project designed to ―erase jurisdictional lines with 
respect to domestic violence issues.‖ Most of these are the types of services that one 
would expect to be sufficiently large to, at least potentially, achieve economies of scale or 
greater effectiveness through interjurisdictional cooperation. Others address equity, or 
work on issues that could create externalities if only considered by individual 
jurisdictions rather than regionally
49
.  
 
 
Figure 22: Organization assists members with interlocal agreements (n=194) 
  
                                            
49
 In the comments following the question about involvement with interlocal agreements, several directors 
admitted that they have attempted to facilitate ILAs, but for one reason or another, those agreements or 
partnerships have not materialized. A couple of the directors mentioned that they are aware of some ILAs 
that are of a less formal nature, in addition to those that are facilitated by their organizations.  
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 The response to whether or not an organization is involved with interlocal 
agreements forms a dichotomous dependent variable for testing the second hypothesis. In 
addition to the primary independent variable—the type of state law—the model includes 
population growth, economic circumstances in the region, years in operation, whether or 
not the organization is or includes an MPO, the number of members in the regional 
council, and a control variable for the director‘s tenure with the organization. The 
literature on interlocal agreements has identified changes in population and economic 
circumstances as providing impetus to communities considering coordinating with other 
jurisdictions for service delivery. Cigler (1999) and Olberding (2002) identified fiscal 
stress or perceived fiscal stress as a motivation for interjurisdictional cooperation. Kwon 
& Feiock (2010) identified population decline as a factor in local governments‘ 
consideration of ILA as a service delivery method. This model was constructed with 
those findings in mind (Table 3).  
 The type of state law does not emerge as a statistically significant factor in 
predicting whether regional councils assist member jurisdictions with forming, 
implementing and/or maintaining interlocal agreements. The number of years an 
organization has operated and population increase are statistically significant variables. 
The importance of the age of an organization is consistent with theory, as one might 
expect an organization in which members have a shared history of working together to 
facilitate interjurisdictional cooperation in a tangible way.  
Some earlier studies observed a decline in population associated with 
interjurisdictional cooperation, while others showed no relationship or a positive 
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correlation
50
. This model, which looks at each region as a whole, shows a positive 
relationship between population increase and a regional council‘s likelihood of working 
on interlocal agreements with its members. A possible explanation for this finding is the 
difference between population change within an individual jurisdiction, and population 
change at the regional level. The finding published by Kwon & Feiock (2010) measured 
population change in each jurisdiction, and included that as a variable in a model 
examining the likelihood of a jurisdiction to consider ILA as an option. LeRoux & Carr 
(2007) and LeRoux (2008) also considered population change at the individual 
jurisdiction level. This survey asked regional council directors whether the population of 
the region they serve has changed in the past ten years. Therefore, the unit of analysis 
differs between this and the earlier studies.  
In this model, growing regional populations are associated with a greater 
likelihood of the regional council working with its members on ILAs. An examination of 
current scholarly literature does not clearly indicate why this might be the case. This may 
be explained by larger numbers of residents placing increased demand for services on 
local governments, which then look for alternative service delivery options to meet those 
higher levels of demand. It might also be that some jurisdictions are experiencing growth 
while others are declining in population. Perhaps jurisdictions experiencing decline are 
the catalysts for developing interlocal agreements. When examining growth at the 
regional level, we are not able to tease out the nuance of growth, decline, a combination 
                                            
50
 Kwon & Feiock (2010) found that population growth was negatively associated with the consideration of 
cooperating through an interlocal agreement. On the other hand, LeRoux & Carr (2007) and LeRoux (2008) 
found mixed results when examining cooperation by service type. Population growth was not related to the 
likelihood of interlocal agreements for some service types (such as police and fire services and streetlights). 
Population growth was positively and significantly related to five out of six water and sewer categories 
(LeRoux & Carr 2007), and to cooperation on roads and bridges (LeRoux 2008), but negatively and 
significantly correlated to cooperation on utilities (LeRoux 2008).   
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of the two, and which of these circumstances is the primary contributor to the 
development of interlocal cooperation. It does appear, however, that population growth at 
the regional level is a factor in the likelihood of regional councils‘ involvement in the 
development and/or management of interlocal agreements.  
 
Table 3: Model for interlocal agreements 
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State Law 
-0.304 0.38 
(0.350)   
Population Increase* 
0.592 0.10 
(0.364)   
Economic Growth 
0.163 0.15 
(0.114)   
Years in Operation* 
0.022 0.09 
(0.013)   
MPO (dummy) 
0.416 0.20 
(0.330)   
Number of Members 
-0.002 0.57 
(0.004)   
Director's Tenure 
0.004 0.80 
(0.017)   
n = 181 
Pseudo R
2
 = .054 
LR Chi
2
 = 12.93 
Prob > chi
2
  = .074 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 In an attempt to further examine the perceptions of regional council directors and 
the effectiveness of regional councils in facilitating cooperation between members, I 
conducted additional analysis (Table 4). This is not related to one of my original 
hypotheses, however it may shed some additional light on the second analysis used to test 
hypothesis one, building on the findings about interlocal agreements. Directors‘ 
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perception of their organizations‘ effectiveness was the dependent variable in the second 
model testing the facilitation of face-to-face meetings. Does an organization‘s 
involvement in interlocal agreements influence the director‘s perceived effectiveness?  
 
Table 4: Reexamining perceived effectiveness  
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State 
Law** 
0.699 0.02 
0.306  
Years in Operation 
0.002 0.88 
0.011  
ILA Involvement** 
0.585 0.05 
0.293  
MPO (dummy) 
-0.421 0.14 
0.285  
Number of 
Members 
0.001 0.83 
0.003  
ED's Tenure 
0.012 0.39 
0.014  
ED's Education*** 
-0.590 0.01 
0.215  
n = 179 
Pseudo R
2
 = .033 
LR Chi
2
 = 19.12 
Prob > chi
2
  = .008 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
Using the second model I built for testing hypothesis one (see Table 2), I simply 
added the variable for ILA involvement (Table 4).  The results of this analysis did not 
change with the addition of the interlocal agreement variable—type of state law remains 
significant, and the other variables such as years in operation and MPO remain 
statistically insignificant. However, an organization‘s involvement with interlocal 
agreements is also statistically significant as a predictor of effectiveness. This would 
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suggest that, though perception of effectiveness is positively skewed, it is based at least in 
part on the organizations‘ ability to work with its members to facilitate cooperative 
agreements
51
.  
4.12: Hypothesis 3  
 
Hypothesis 3 is stated: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are 
more likely to report large-scale interlocal agreements, than those in states with enabling 
legislation. LeRoux (2008) studied interlocal agreements and found that adjacent borders 
are a factor in a jurisdictions‘ decision to enter into an ILA. Others have hinted at the 
difficulty of getting many jurisdictions to cooperate on a given issue (Vogel & 
Nezelkewicz 2002). This led me to examine the scale of interlocal agreements. Those 
directors who responded that their organizations are involved with interlocal agreements 
received a follow-up question regarding how many organizations are involved in the 
―typical‖ interlocal agreement in their region. Recognizing that these sorts of 
arrangements vary widely, this question was designed to probe a bit further into the realm 
of interlocal agreements and the cooperation they represent.  
 According to survey respondents, 72 percent of interlocal agreements, in which 
the regional councils have some involvement, are among six or fewer jurisdictions. 
Eighty-five percent are among fewer than fifteen jurisdictions (Figure 23). This suggests 
that interlocal agreements are being used more often between a relatively small number 
of jurisdictions than as a truly region-wide tool for interjurisdictional cooperation.  
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 Just as it appears that experiencing success as a broker of interlocal agreements positively influences a 
director‘s perceived effectiveness, the sense that one is effective could also further influence an 
organization‘s future involvement in facilitating interjurisdictional cooperation. A limitation of cross-
sectional data is the analysts‘ inability to test which comes first. In this case, it seems more likely that 
success leads to a sense of effectiveness rather than the reverse.  
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 To further explore the scale of interlocal agreements, I examined the nine 
responses indicating their typical interlocal agreement involved twenty or more 
jurisdictions. One might expect those truly large-scale agreements to be facilitated by 
MPOs, as their role is to address transportation on a region-wide scale (Chakraborty 
2010). However, this was not the whole story. Of these nine organizations, six are (or 
include) MPOs, but the three others are not. When asked whether they worked on 
transportation planning, though, eight of the nine responded affirmatively. The nine 
organizations formed between 1964 and 1982. With the exception of one organization 
based in New York and one based in the state of Washington, the other seven are within 
the southern United States. 
 
 
Figure 23: Number of jurisdictions in typical interlocal agreement (n=116) 
 
 
 
 The type of state law is not a statistically significant factor in the scale of 
interlocal agreements in which a regional council is involved (Table 5). The only variable 
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in the model that is statistically significant is population increase over the past ten years. 
Population growth appears as a factor in both whether a regional council is involved with 
ILAs, and the scope of the agreements being formed with the assistance of a regional 
council. Chapter five will further consider the potential implications of this finding.  
 
Table 5: Model for scale of interlocal agreements
52
 
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State Law 
-0.023 0.95 
(0.377)   
Population Increase** 
0.957 0.05 
(0.486)   
Economic Growth 
0.113 0.41 
(0.137)   
Years in Operation 
0.014 0.37 
(0.015)   
MPO (dummy) 
0.517 0.17 
(0.372)   
Number of Members 
-0.002 0.72 
(0.004)   
Director's Tenure 
0.028 0.13 
(0.019)   
n = 110 
Pseudo R
2
 = .037 
LR Chi
2
 = 12.32 
Prob > chi
2
  = .090 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
While the prevalence of ILAs is undeniable, the vast majority of regional councils 
report that the ―typical‖ ILA involves relatively few players. This sparks the question of 
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 The pool of respondents to this question included only those who had responded affirmatively that their 
organizations work with members on interlocal agreements. Therefore, the selection is a subset of the 
survey sample. The results of this model must be interpreted with additional caution due to this small 
sample size, which raises concerns that the maximum likelihood estimations will not be efficient and 
unbiased. 
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whether the ILA tool provides a workable method of promoting regional governance, or 
is better suited for small and medium-scale, systems maintenance service provision—
somewhere between individual local government provision and full regional cooperation. 
This is a topic for further examination.  
4.13: Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 is stated: Regional councils in states with prescriptive legislation are 
more likely (than those in states with enabling legislation) to report cooperative attitudes 
among members. Survey participants were asked to rate the statement ―Members in this 
organization believe that working together can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes‖ 
(Figure 24) on a scale of one to ten (where one means ―do not agree‖ and ten means 
―strongly agree‖). This item was intended to measure the sense of a shared ―destiny‖ that 
Cigler (1999) described among jurisdictions that develop trust and a tradition of 
cooperation (see also Thurmaier & Wood 2002; Wood 2006; LeRoux, Brandenburger, & 
Pandey 2010). This was the first of two ways in which I attempted to measure 
cooperation among members.  
Like other questions measuring perception, the responses to this survey item are 
skewed toward ―strongly agree.‖ Seventy-eight percent of participants responded with 
between eight and ten, on a scale of one to ten. Only seven directors assigned a five or 
lower to this item.  
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Figure 24: Director perception that members believe in mutually beneficial outcomes (n=193) 
 
 
 The type of state legislation does not have a statistically significant influence on 
directors‘ perception of the belief in mutually beneficial outcomes among regional 
council members (Table 6). Of the other independent variables in the model, only the 
MPO variable and the directors‘ tenure and education are statistically significant. 
Organizations that are MPOs, or include an MPO in their structure are significantly less 
likely to report high levels of believing that working together will lead to mutually 
beneficial results. It is possible that the types of work conducted through an MPO are 
more contentious than the work of other types of regional councils, or that members 
perceive that transportation outcomes are a zero-sum game—leaving some jurisdictions 
worse off while others benefit.  
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Table 6: Model for perception of attitudes on mutually beneficial outcomes 
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State Law 
0.129 0.67 
(0.303)   
Population Increase 
0.478 0.14 
(0.325)   
Years in Operation 
0.006 0.64 
(0.012)   
MPO (dummy)** 
-0.579 0.05 
(0.290)   
Number of Members 
-0.002 0.61 
(0.003)   
Director's Tenure** 
0.033 0.03 
(0.015)   
Director's 
Education*** 
-0.650 0.00 
(0.227)   
n = 179 
Pseudo R
2
 = .035 
LR Chi
2
 = 19.20 
Prob > chi
2
  = .008 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
 The second survey item intended to measure cooperation was worded in the 
reverse: ―Members in this organization have competitive attitudes or rivalries that get in 
the way of working together‖ (Figure 25). This item was also on a scale of one to ten 
(where one means ―do not agree‖ and ten means ―strongly agree‖), however it was not 
nearly as skewed as the two perception-based items discussed previously. There is, 
nonetheless, a statistically significant, negative bivariate correlation between the 
responses to this item and the responses to the previous item about mutually beneficial 
outcomes. The fact that more directors admitted rivalries than responded with a low 
number on the mutual benefit question suggests that in some cases, local government 
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leaders acknowledge there could be benefit in working with other jurisdictions, but that 
competitive attitudes prevent that from becoming a reality.  
  
 
Figure 25: Director perception of competitive attitudes (n=193) 
 
 
 The open-ended responses reflected a similar dissonance between working 
together and coming up against crippling rivalries. While some directors report ―a great 
sense of regionalism‖ in the area in which they work, as one director of a SuperCOG in 
Arkansas expressed, other feel less optimistic. A COG director from New York 
expressed, ―We could do a better job at addressing interlocal issues.‖  
 A COG director from Missouri stated their members ―believe in working together, 
but we serve five counties. One county is the concentration of population and 
development (50 percent of regional population), [and the] four remaining rural counties 
exhibit defensiveness.‖ On the other hand, a COG director from Utah described a 
different attitude among it members: ―The Six County Region is very diverse. Utah's 
regions were organized in the late 1960s.  There have been significant changes since then 
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but the region(s) continue to work well together.  There is give and take for each county 
involved which makes for success.‖ This director‘s comments even suggest that there are 
different ways of defining a region—that regions within the larger region may exist. In 
this case, the longevity of the organization appears to be influencing its ability to broker 
cooperation among members.  
The level of competitive attitudes or rivalries among members is not predicted by 
the type of state legislation (Table 7). Only population growth is a statistically significant 
factor in this model, having a negative relationship with competitiveness. In other words, 
in regions that have experienced population growth over the past decade, regional council 
directors are less likely to report competitive attitudes among members that prevent 
working together. One possible explanation for this finding is that ―new blood‖ in a 
community does not carry with it a region‘s old ways of doing things. If rivalries existed 
between communities within a region in the past, perhaps new residents and leaders do 
not harbor those attitudes. This may be a finding of importance for growing regions, 
indicating that they might have an opportunity to seize, while regions experiencing 
population decline might want to focus on building good will and actively working to 
diminish the rivalries that jurisdictions may still hold against others in the region.  
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Table 7: Model for perception of competitive attitudes 
      
  Coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Type of State Law 
-0.343 0.24 
(0.289)   
Population Increase** 
-0.603 0.05 
(0.306)   
Years in Operation 
-0.007 0.52 
(0.011)   
MPO (dummy) 
0.414 0.13 
(0.272)   
Number of Members 
-0.001 0.70 
(0.003)   
Director's Tenure** 
-0.026 0.07 
(0.014)   
Director's Education 
0.119 0.55 
(0.200)   
n = 180 
Pseudo R
2
 = .017 
LR Chi
2
 = 13.18 
Prob > chi
2
  = .068 
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
4.14: Does Proximity Matter? 
Two other questions on the survey provide some insight into the scale of work 
conducted by regional councils, and the ease or difficulty with which local governments 
work with others in the region, based on proximity. LeRoux (2008) identified adjacent 
borders as a significant factor in the decision of jurisdictions to engage in an interlocal 
agreement. The first of these two questions asked directors whether they observed this 
tendency among the jurisdictions in their region by having them rate this statement: 
―Members are more likely to work together with other members who share a 
jurisdictional boundary, than those who are geographically located farther away,‖ (where 
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one means ―do not agree‖ and ten means ―strongly agree‖). Sixty percent of respondents 
selected seven or higher (Figure 26). This suggests that the majority of directors perceive 
a greater level of cooperation between jurisdictions that are located near one another than 
between those that are farther apart. The concept of shared destiny or mutual benefit 
appears throughout the literature regarding regional cooperation. This finding, supported 
by LeRoux‘s (2008) work, indicates that the individual players within a region might not 
always view themselves as being on the same team.  
A director of an organization in Arizona elaborated by writing, ―members are 
more likely to work with other members if they are about the same size.‖ This suggests 
that feeling a sense of similarity with another community helps to generate cooperation, 
but that sharing a boundary is not the only similarity local leaders might recognize.  
 
 
Figure 26: Proximity as a factor in cooperation (n=193) 
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 Directors were also asked whether their organizations were effective at addressing 
issues that involve many jurisdictions. Seventy-four percent selected between seven and 
ten on a scale of one to ten (Figure 27). This indicates that despite the difficulty they may 
face in getting individual members to view themselves as part of a region, directors 
believe their organizations are capable of doing just that. Without further defining 
effectiveness and providing evidence of an organization‘s effectiveness, this question 
must be treated as simply reflecting the perception of a director. Further work is needed 
in order to truly understand what constitutes regional council effectiveness and how to 
measure it.   
 
 
 
Figure 27: Director perception of effectiveness working with many jurisdictions (n=193) 
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4.15: Demographic Characteristics of Executive Directors 
The executive directors of regional councils exhibit little diversity, at least in 
terms of typically measured demographic characteristics. The majority of directors are 
white males with a graduate or professional degree. In fact, 76 percent are male (Figure 
28).  
 
 
Figure 28: Gender of executive directors (n=180) 
 
 
 Most directors identified themselves as Caucasian/white. Only five percent 
identified themselves as belonging to any other race or ethnicity, including multiracial 
(Figure 29).  
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Figure 29: Race/ethnicity of executive directors (n=190) 
The vast majority of directors hold a college degree (Figure 30). Only three 
percent report having less education than a four-year degree. Thirty-two percent currently 
have a bachelor‘s degree. Fifty-eight percent have a graduate or professional degree. 
Many of those with graduate degrees specified a degree in planning or an MPA degree. 
Seven percent indicate that they have earned a post-graduate degree. 
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Figure 30: Education of executive directors (n=192) 
Ninety-seven percent of regional council directors are over the age of 35. In fact, 
more than half are over the age of 55 (Figure 31). 
Figure 31: Age of executive directors (n=192) 
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Most directors identify themselves as politically moderate. Only 16 percent 
consider themselves liberal, while 20 percent respond they are conservative (Figure 32). 
Figure 32: Political ideology of executive directors (n=178) 
When asked about political affiliation, almost half responded they are unaffiliated 
with a political party. The percentage of directors that are affiliated with the Republican 
Party is roughly equivalent to those that responded they are politically conservative, at 21 
percent. Thirty-two percent are affiliated with the Democrats. The remaining two percent 
are Libertarians (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33: Political affiliation of executive directors (n=178) 
4.16: Summary of Findings 
Chapter five will discuss the substantive aspects of this study‘s findings and 
explore the implications for state and local governments seeking to improve upon 
regional cooperation. Overall, the type of state legislation—prescriptive or enabling—
does not appear to exert a statistically significant influence on the functioning of regional 
councils across the United States. The only model in this research in which the type of 
legislation emerges as statistically significant pertains to the regional council director‘s 
perception of his or her effectiveness at facilitating face-to-face meetings among 
members (Hypothesis one, part two). 
Perhaps the most salient, and also most surprising finding pertains to population 
growth within a region. Population growth is positively correlated with both the 
likelihood of regional councils facilitating interlocal agreements, and the scale or size of 
those agreements as measured by the number of participants in a ―typical‖ agreement. 
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This finding is particularly interesting, given that some other studies found population 
growth to be negatively correlated with (or unrelated to) the likelihood of a jurisdiction 
engaging in interlocal agreements
53
. Population growth in a region is also negatively
related to reports of competitive attitudes or rivalries between member jurisdictions 
within a region. Chapter five will examine this finding in more depth. 
The length of time a regional council has operated is significantly related to both 
the frequency of face-to-face meetings among council members, and the likelihood that 
the organization is involved with facilitating interlocal agreements. This is consistent 
with the stream of literature that springs from Thurmaier & Wood (2002), and their 
melding of the literature on public management networks with the work of sociologists. 
The classification of an organization as an MPO (or containing a region‘s MPO 
within its structure) is positively related to the frequency of meetings an organization 
holds, and also negatively significant in the model of member attitudes about mutually 
beneficial outcomes. Chapter five will examine MPOs as a special type of regional 
council, and review these findings in light of those special circumstances. 
Given the dearth of empirical data on regional councils, this research seeks to 
contribute to a clearer picture of the work of regional councils across the United States. It 
is also my hope that theory related to regional governance will be strengthened by the 
findings of this research. 
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 See footnote 50, which details the findings of LeRoux & Carr (2007), LeRoux (2008), and Kwon & 
Feiock (2010). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 Scholars and practitioners alike have long recognized the importance of 
regionalism, even as disagreement over the form it should take has persisted. Regional 
councils and similar organizations that exist alongside local governments serve the 
purpose of facilitating discussion and cooperation between individual jurisdictions on 
matters that extend beyond municipal boundaries. In some cases, their work might create 
economies of scale, greater technical efficiency, and other forms of cost savings to the 
local governments they serve. Despite the potential importance of regional councils, and 
the fact that they have frequently been cited in the literature as a factor in interlocal 
cooperation, little empirical work has examined these organizations themselves.  
 This study paints a broad portrait of the regional council currently operating in the 
United States. It finds the directors of these organizations, on average, to be a 
homogeneous group of well-educated, mid-career professionals. They are mostly white, 
mostly male, and frequently identify themselves as politically moderate and unaffiliated 
to a political party. The majority of regional councils in the study were formed between 
1965 and 1975. Sixty-five percent of participating organizations operate in states with 
prescriptive legislation related to regional cooperation, while 34 percent are in states with 
enabling legislation. Only one percent of organizations are in states without either of 
these types of blanket legislation. On the whole, regional council organizations report 
they do not have the “teeth” to ensure meaningful participation on the part of members, 
 
 
or to ―coerce‖ cooperation. They report their members, on average, understand the 
importance of working together for mutual benefit, however they acknowledge that 
individual local governments are more likely to be willing to work with other local 
governments who share a jurisdictional boundary, or have other similarities with their 
own community, rather than engage in broader regional efforts at problem solving.  
 This study provides evidence for the following five concepts, which this chapter 
explores in greater depth:  
1. Differences in state laws, identified in this study as prescriptive or enabling, do 
not generally have a significant influence on the manner in which regional councils 
operate or their effectiveness.  
2. Population growth appears to be an important factor influencing interlocal 
cooperation.  
3. A history of working together as a regional council increases the frequency of 
face-to-face meetings and likelihood of ILA facilitation.  
4. MPOs operate differently than broad-based COGs.  
5. Proximity is a factor in cooperation.  
 
5.1: Influence of State Laws 
This study examines face-to-face interaction between members of regional 
councils, previously identified as a precursor to cooperation (Thurmaier & Wood 2002; 
Wood, 2006; LeRoux, Brandenburger and Pandey 2010). The type of state law does not 
have a statistically significant influence on the frequency of formal meetings; rather the 
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length of an organization‘s operation and the existence of an MPO within the 
organization‘s structure predict the frequency of meetings.  
The type of state law is significant in the model that examines an organization‘s 
effectiveness at facilitating face-to-face interactions between members, as judged by the 
executive directors. Those in states with prescriptive legislation are statistically more 
likely to respond that they are effective in this regard. This could support the theory that 
coercion to participate is generating more effective face-to-face interaction—and 
therefore leading to cooperation at some future point in time. However, we must interpret 
this finding with caution, as it is based on the leader‘s own perception of his or her 
effectiveness. 
In the models that examine the regional council‘s facilitation of cooperation 
through interlocal agreements, the scale of a ―typical‖ interlocal agreement within a given 
region, and the level of competitiveness of members (and conversely their perception that 
cooperating can be mutually beneficial), the type of blanket state legislation does not 
emerge as a statistically significant factor. The difference between enabling legislation 
and prescriptive legislation does not appear to play a substantive role in the current 
functioning of regional councils.  
It is possible that the state laws, many of which have existed for four decades or 
longer, no longer have the influence they once had on the formation and operation of 
regional councils. Another possibility is that state laws, though influential in the 
formation of organizations, were not as influential as the federal legislation, which 
provided incentives in the form of various types of financial support for the creation of 
regional councils.  
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Providing further evidence for the limited influence of the type of state law on the 
work of regional councils is the response from executive directors in states with 
prescriptive legislation that their organizations are ―voluntary.‖ This suggests that, even 
in states in which the governor or other state official has designated which local 
governments shall form a regional council, the law is either loosely interpreted or does 
not result in a penalty for municipalities that select not to participate. Therefore, even the 
more heavy-handed of the two identified types of state legislation is not particularly 
coercive.  
5.2: Population Growth 
 An increase in population within a region is statistically significant in three of the 
models in this study—positively related to the regional council‘s facilitation of interlocal 
agreements, positively associated with the number of jurisdictions involved in a region‘s 
―typical‖ interlocal agreement (in which the regional council has some involvement), and 
negatively related to the level of competitive attitudes among members, as reported by 
the executive director of the regional council.  
 Changes in population can lead to changes in the way local governments provide 
services. Increases in population could result in the fiscal stress that scholars have 
identified as encouraging local governments to consider interlocal agreements (Cigler 
1999; Olberding 2002; LeRoux & Carr 2007). However, population decline could also be 
a motivating factor in the consideration of interlocal cooperation (Kwon & Feiock 2010). 
Prior studies have examined population change at the level of individual jurisdictions, 
rather than the region, as this study specified.  
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 Though the literature does not provide a clear causal mechanism, I argue that 
population growth, at the regional level, could influence the work of local leaders—and 
the work of regional councils—by infusing new ideas about how to provide services, as 
well as larger scale land use/transportation planning challenges. In addition to bringing 
new ideas to the table, experiencing growth within the region likely brings people into the 
area who do not harbor any long-standing mistrust or negative attitudes toward other 
jurisdictions within the region that could hamper efforts to cooperate. This topic deserves 
further investigation.  
5.3: Trust 
 Trust develops over time, through repeated interactions, allowing regional 
councils with a long history of operation to more effectively facilitate partnerships or 
cooperation between member jurisdictions. The number of years a regional council has 
been operating is statistically significant in the models representing the frequency of face-
to-face meetings and the likelihood that the regional council works to facilitate interlocal 
agreements among its members. In both cases, the relationship is positive—regional 
councils that have been in existence longer are more likely to have frequent meetings and 
more likely to assist with formal interlocal agreements.  
 This finding supports the work conducted by Thurmaier & Wood (2002), who 
closely studied the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) in the Kansas City 
metropolitan area, and others that have followed along similar lines. While trust itself is a 
difficult concept to operationalize, the development of a shared history and ―norms of 
reciprocity‖ appears to occur over time, generating a culture that supports cooperation.  
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5.4: MPOs are Different 
MPOs were initially formed when the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 gave 
them a role in regional transportation planning for MSAs with at least 50,000 residents. 
Being the product of federal legislation, rather than state legislation or an organic 
development on the part of local leaders, MPOs are distinct from other regional councils. 
Their focus on transportation planning sets them apart from organizations with other 
primary goals or broader based organizations that work in numerous service areas. The 
federal devolution of authority on urban policy that occurred in the 1980s affected MPOs 
profoundly—perhaps more so than other types of regional councils (as predicted by 
Bowman & Franke 1984). Only as the twentieth century drew to a close did MPOs get a 
renewed sense of purpose through the ISTEA legislation and TEA-21 (Wolf & Farquhar 
2005).  
When a regional council operates as an MPO, or includes an MPO within its 
structure, it behaves differently in the quantitative models that represent the frequency of 
meetings and the belief among members that cooperation can lead to mutual benefit. On 
the one hand, MPOs are more likely than non-MPO regional councils to facilitate 
frequent face-to-face meetings among members. On the other hand, MPO directors are 
significantly less likely to report that members believe cooperation is mutually beneficial.  
This signifies that MPOs, by their very nature, address issues that are inherently more 
contentious than basic service delivery or abstract discussions of cooperation. Local 
communities stand to gain or lose from decisions related to transportation, land-use, and 
urban form (Downs 1994; Turner, Wial, & Wolman 2008). As Wolf and Farquhar (2005) 
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argue, local governments carefully guard their authority over issues related to the 
integration of land use and transportation (1072).   
At the same time, MPOs are modeled as regional councils, dependent on the 
voluntary cooperation of member jurisdictions (Wolf and Farquhar 2005). This leads to a 
conservative approach to decision-making (Leland & Whisman 2012), and weakness on 
matters that do not reach consensus among members (Wolf and Farquhar 2005). These 
weaknesses have generated concerns that the institutional structures to address truly 
regional issues in a comprehensive manner simply do not exist (Downs 1994; Grigsby 
1996; Visser 2004; Wolf and Farquhar 2005).  
Respondents to this survey confirmed scholars‘ concerns with their comments. 
According to a Florida MPO director, ―Dues are voluntary and lack of payment does not 
limit voting authority,‖ in that regional council. The director of a North Carolina MPO 
offered that members who do not actively participate in the organization receive a ―slap 
on the wrist,‖ indicating that the MPO lacks authority. Considering the far-reaching 
influence of the types of work MPOs are meant to conduct, these limitations are 
significant. 
5.5: Proximity is Important 
This study examined whether local governments are engaging in truly regional 
efforts, or if they are more likely to work together with other local governments who are 
their immediate neighbors. While not one of the primary hypotheses of this study, the 
findings suggest that in many cases, proximity is indeed an important consideration in 
voluntary cooperation. LeRoux and Carr (2007) suggested that adjacent borders could 
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influence the likelihood of a local government engaging in interlocal agreements for 
service delivery. 
While small scale regionalism is undeniably occurring through the use of 
interlocal agreements between small numbers of jurisdictions, similar sorts of agreements 
do not appear as likely to form when larger issues, and therefore larger numbers of 
jurisdictions, are concerned. Those large-scale agreements would represent 
correspondingly large-scale issues such as transportation, land use, and the environment 
(Downs 1994; Jimenez & Hendrick 2010; Wolf and Farquhar 2005; Turner, Wial, & 
Wolman 2008). These large-scale, regional issues interact with one another, and will 
shape the future of our communities and influence the quality of life for subsequent 
generations. Finding true regionalism is a foremost challenge facing America‘s regions 
today. This concern is a focus of the final section of this report. 
5.6: How Do these Findings Fit into the Bigger Picture of Regional Governance?
This study has not attempted to measure outcomes of regional cooperation, but 
has focused on the organizations that work to facilitate cooperation, and the rules by 
which they were established and are governed. This is important work, and further study 
is warranted. In addition, examining outcomes across a variety of contexts will be an 
important goal of future research. Turner, Wial, & Wolman (2008) outlined the 
complexity of measuring outcomes—even determining which outcomes are desirable is a 
subjective matter when considering policy through a metropolitan lens. Olberding (2002, 
2009), while acknowledging the complexity of evaluating outcomes rather than simply 
outputs (such as interlocal agreements), has attempted to move the field of study in that 
direction, within the context of regional economic development organizations. She used 
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employment change and income change as the desired outcomes. Turner, Wial, & 
Wolman (2008) point out that measuring economic development in a metropolitan area 
might be more appropriately accomplished by examining whether the earnings of an 
area‘s existing residents have changed. They point out the differential effects of policies 
on various demographic groups, and argue that simply measuring changes in the area‘s 
tax base, total employment, or average earnings, may mask equity issues in economic 
development. This highlights the challenges, and subjective nature, of determining the 
success or effectiveness of regional cooperation efforts. Researchers must be mindful of 
potential bias in developing research designs to examine the outcomes of policy. 
Conducting the type of analysis that Olberding has attempted with regional partnerships 
for economic development with organizations that work in broader contexts will be even 
more challenging, as the goals extend beyond a single context (such as transportation or 
economic development). Additionally, desired outcomes might vary from one region to 
another, along with other localized circumstances, further complicating analysis. 
Nonetheless, researchers must find ways to make meaningful recommendations for 
policy formulation and implementation.  
This research was not designed to examine outcomes, but to better understand the 
regional council organizations that attempt to facilitate cooperation between local 
governments. It sheds some light on the difficulties executive directors face when trying 
to foster face-to-face interaction intended to generate trust and a sense that communities 
can be better off for cooperating. This study indicates the current types of state 
legislation—whether enabling or prescriptive—do not, for the most part, influence 
whether or not regional councils are able to provide an environment conducive to 
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regional cooperation. Though the majority of regional councils are actively facilitating 
interlocal agreements between member jurisdictions, most of those agreements are 
smaller scale, between just a handful of members rather than the entire region, indicating 
they are typically addressing smaller scale service delivery issues and not the broader 
regional issues that affect the metropolitan area as a whole. This highlights what other 
research has indicated—regional councils lack the authority to make hard decisions and 
resort to conservative measures instead. The question remains: is there a better way to 
structure these organizations that would provide them with the ability to truly coordinate 
regional decision-making? 
5.7: How Should Regional Councils such as COGs and MPOs be Structured?  
As Oakerson (1999) expressed in regard to local governments themselves, there is 
―no one correct pattern of organization‖ (114). The answers instead lie in separating 
provision from production, giving residents choices in terms of how to constitute and 
govern their communities, and being sure that an ―umbrella jurisdiction,‖ which 
complements rather than competing with the local governments it overlies, ties together 
central cities with their suburbs (123). Regional councils could function as the overlying 
jurisdiction Oakerson describes. However, they do not have ―the power of regional 
government‖ (Visser 2004, 61).  
Even as large-scale, regional issues are a primary policy concern, regional 
government exists in only a couple of examples in the U.S. While authorities at the 
national, state, and local levels can set focused policy priorities, make decisions, and 
carry out actions accordingly (to the extent possible given budgetary constraints at any 
point in time), no such body exists at the regional level, with the exception of Metro in 
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the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area, and to a lesser degree in Minneapolis/St. Paul. 
Regional councils can provide a forum for discussion of region-wide concerns and allow 
for collaborative planning. However, they do not typically have the authority to make 
binding decisions. As Visser (2004) noted, ―Voluntary regional council collaboration 
may not be an effective substitute for regional governance, but it is superior to destructive 
interlocal competition or isolationism in the interdependent metropolis‖ (61).  
However, Wolf and Farquhar (2005) take a less optimistic stance in stating, 
―Strong regional institutions are critical for effective metropolitan-wide governance to 
flourish‖ (1072). Today‘s regional councils do not, by and large, represent the strong 
institutions Wolf and Farquhar envision. Regional councils tend toward conservative 
action (Visser 2004; Grigsby 1996; Leland & Whisman 2012) as they attempt to maintain 
their voluntary membership by avoiding conflict. As such, their ability to pursue and 
enact decisive policy related to regional outcomes is muted, if not absent.  
Wolf and Bryan (2009) describe regional councils as ―relatively weak and 
ineffective, caused in large part by the institutional intergovernmental context in which 
they must function. They are often forced to avoid conflicts among the local governments 
involved and work on relatively noncontroversial issues‖ (61-62). Visser (2004) refers to 
the context in which these organizations work as the ―idiosyncratic history‖ of regional 
councils. The personality and leadership styles of directors and the individuals 
representing member jurisdictions, along with their past interactions and the trust (or lack 
of trust) they have developed over time, will differentially affect each regional council.  
A COG director from Arizona weighed in on this concept by responding on the 
survey, ―Past experiences play in but turn over [sic] of elected officials and staff 
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minimize the impact.‖ In this director‘s opinion, having new members involved in the 
regional council mitigates the potentially problematic aspects of history.  
Directors of organizations from Texas and Ohio shared statements on the survey 
that reflected comparable experiences. A COG director from Texas wrote, ―Overall, our 
members work very well together, and we generally are able to get past historic rivalries.  
However, each year there are one to two folks that ‗get in the way‘ of regional projects 
and progress.‖ Similarly, the director of an Ohio SuperCOG shared, ―I think we get a 
great deal of cooperation amongst member jurisdictions. Although, there are a few people 
who have trouble working with anyone.‖ The regional council directors and staff find 
themselves trying to encourage cooperation from sometimes reluctant participants.  
Another opinion was shared by a SuperCOG director from Arkansas: ―Whether or 
not there are rivalries between the jurisdictions depends on who is in office. Currently, 
everyone is very cooperative, which has not always been the case.‖ This suggests that the 
strength of leadership among the member jurisdictions plays an important role in the 
ability of a regional council to carry out its work.  
The work of regional council staff was articulated by the director of a Nevada 
SuperCOG in these words: ―There are inherent tensions between the disparate states and 
local government jurisdictions represented on our Board. Those tensions need to be 
constantly managed but generally the mission of the agency…is to find solutions to those 
intergovernmental rivalries where they arise in order to accomplish statutory goals. 
Difficult, time consuming, politically complicated, but we get it done.‖ This attitude 
reflects both a sense of efficacy on the part of the director, and the reality of the 
challenging and complex nature of getting groups to cooperate.  
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Orfield (2002) took exception to ―consensus-based regionalists‖ (as contrasted 
with the harder hitting ―progressive‖ regionalists of the past) and argued that not 
everyone will be happy with the outcomes of regional decision-making. A North Carolina 
MPO director spoke along similar lines with this comment: ―There are always rivalries in 
an intergovernmental organization. The trick for staff is to ensure that those rivalries do 
not derail work. In our case staff works hard to ensure that decisions consider elected 
official input and needs. Essentially informed consent. I do not believe that consensus is a 
good option. Sometimes not everyone is happy. That‘s just a fact.‖ This director‘s candid 
words reflect Orfield‘s sentiments about the manner in which regional cooperation has 
developed and the expectation some have for consensus-based regionalism.  
Grigsby (1996) concluded, ―In the final analysis… dedicated leadership resolved 
to address these difficult… issues will be the factor which makes the difference‖ (57). 
Effective leadership is undoubtedly a key factor in building stronger regional 
cooperation. Scholars and practitioners alike have grappled with the role of leaders in 
collaborative or network governance scenarios. Wolf & Bryan (2009) assert that 
successful regional councils are those that develop ―effective processes for collaboration 
and consensus building that allow them to work with diverse interests around common 
problems‖ (66). Weber & Khademian (2008) similarly argue that local public managers 
will need to become, or identify and work closely with, ―collaborative capacity builders‖ 
in network settings, in order to effectively address wicked or complex problems (334). 
But how is that best accomplished? O‘Toole (1997) noted that public administrators face 
the challenge of operating in complex networks, without the help of theory to guide their 
efforts.  
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 Silvia (2011) expresses that the study of collaborative governance still has a long 
way to grow, recognizes that network leadership is fundamentally different from 
hierarchical leadership, and argues that local leaders need to develop a different skillset 
than what was required traditionally. Confirming what other scholars have written about 
cooperation between entities, Silvia identifies trust as ―the glue that holds the network 
together‖ (70), while acknowledging that scholars and practitioners need to develop a 
stronger understanding of how to achieve the desired outcomes within the network 
environment. As both a practical matter and a topic of study, network governance and 
collaborative problem solving remain puzzling.  
 Specifically in regard to regional councils, what measures should be taken to 
encourage true regional cooperation? While Nunn & Rosentraub (1997) assert that there 
is ―no one best way to encourage cooperation‖ (205), Downs (1994) sees voluntary 
cooperation between local governments as the ―least satisfactory response‖ to larger scale 
regional concerns. Specifically examining the issues related to growth, Downs concedes 
that some smaller scale policy concerns, such as addressing traffic congestion by timing 
signals, might be well managed through voluntary cooperation. However, when policies 
related to regional land use, transportation, and growth ―require allocating benefits and 
costs among jurisdictions, sacrifices on the part of one locality or another, or other 
controversial decisions, this approach does not work‖ (170-171).  
After observing a decision-making process undertaken by an MPO in the 
Louisville area, Vogel and Nezelkewicz (2002) concluded, ―More attention needs to be 
focused on how to better structure and manage the intergovernmental system to achieve 
greater coordination and coherence in metropolitan policies‖ (127). The process did not 
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take into consideration the land use component (or sprawl, in the authors words) when 
selecting the site for a new bridge across the Ohio River. This is not entirely surprising, 
given the Federal-Aid Policy Guide
54
 statement that the plans and programs carried out 
by MPOs ―facilitate the efficient, economic movement of people and goods.‖ This 
narrow focus does not recognize the interconnected nature of transportation, land use, 
environmental and economic concerns.  
 Bollens (1997) refers to the current forms of regional cooperation as ―shadow‖ 
regionalism. He writes, ―Shadow regionalism bears but a faint connection to the true 
potential of regional governance [which would] integrate environmental, social, and 
economic policies on a metropolitan wide scale‖ (119). Evidence suggests, based on the 
findings of this study and others cited in this chapter, that true regionalism has not yet 
been realized in most regions of the United States. Regional councils have been 
successful in generating conversations, and cooperation on some services, however they 
lack the authority to make the difficult decisions that will be required if regions are to 
function in a coordinated manner on large-scale issues. Is it possible to take the current 
structure of voluntary associations of local government and mold these organizations into 
authorities capable of coordinating regional decision-making? 
Scholars have made some suggestions regarding better coordination of regional 
decision-making. For those who focus on service provision, the evidence seems clear that 
voluntary interjurisdictional cooperation is not only possible, but fairly common. For 
those considering truly regional issues, the outcomes of voluntary cooperation through 
regional governance, as is typically facilitated by regional councils, is far less certain.  
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Jimenez and Hendrick (2010) wrap up their article ―Is Government Consolidation the 
Answer?‖ with more questions, rather than a conclusion. They wonder whether voluntary 
cooperation will be sufficient in responding to region-wide problems such as ―sprawl‖ 
(266). Wood (2006), in examining the Kansas City region, observes quite a bit of 
cooperation on what he refers to as system maintenance service, and expresses optimism 
that this sort of cooperation will build into a ―democratic regional community‖ (350) 
capable of addressing regional concerns.  
Chakraborty (2010), however, argues that, though transportation is being 
addressed through regional governance, it is not being comprehensively considered with 
the interrelated issue of land-use planning. He finds that some local governments are 
working together through a process known as scenario planning to formulate plans for 
coordinating land use with transportation. He argues that in the absence of regional 
government, governance can be effective at addressing regional issues, but only with a 
process in place that is agreed upon in advance. Even so, limitations remain. For 
example, the buy-in from individual local governments is not a sure thing. The sort of 
scenario planning described is still a voluntary process, and therefore not binding.  
Vogel and Nezelkewicz (2002) argue, ―metropolitan governance requires more careful 
‗structuring‘ with the region and between the region and the state and federal 
governments.‖ They believe greater coordination between transportation and land use 
planning can occur if ―states embrace ‗smart growth‘ and delegate this authority to 
regional agencies,‖ such as COGs and MPOs (129).  
Grisby (1996) wrote, ―In the past, the federal government has been the primary 
driver behind formulating regional strategies. In the future, it will be states prompted by 
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the private sector and community-based groups who forge the types of partnerships 
required for regional organizations to become more effective‖ (53). Gordon (2007) agrees 
that states can play a role in incentivizing cooperation (particularly in the area of 
economic development).  
Scholars‘ suggestions of state intervention are, perhaps intentionally, vague. How 
exactly such legislation would be crafted, the manner in which regional councils would 
aggregate the preferences of individual jurisdictions—or override their wishes—and the 
resulting regional structures have not been fleshed out by scholars or by legislators. 
Moving from a voluntary system of regional cooperation to one that is mandated seems 
heavy-handed in some regards, and would represent a major shift in how regional 
councils operate.  
In fact, one survey respondent, a COG director from Wisconsin, wrote, ―To 
achieve successful regional collaboration, commitment to long-term collaboration and 
cooperation is needed at the highest levels of leadership in the region. This commitment 
and the related political leadership are absent in our region.‖ This comment seems to 
acknowledge that greater involvement on the part of the state would be welcomed.  
Similarly, a Massachusetts regional council director wrote that, ―Massachusetts 
does not support regional planning to any great extent, at least financially. Its recent 
support focuses on reducing municipal costs in light of continuing tight state budgets 
through ‗regionalization.‘ There is no state level planning department. We are a ‗home 
rule‘ state that impedes regionalization.‖ Like the director from Wisconsin, this 
respondent seems frustrated with a lack of involvement or support for regional decision-
making at the state level.  
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On the other hand, a director of a New York COG described changes at the state 
level that affected regional councils in this manner: ―This region is very diverse. The 
counties we serve have strong individual identities as well as issues. The current 
economic situation has forced the counties to seek out cooperation and many are 
beginning to think regionally. Unfortunately in NY the Governor has restructured his 
statewide funding, created new Regional Economic Development Councils and appointed 
all the members and tied these new districts to the state grant funding process—
marginalizing the existing regional councils in the process.‖ The director has observed a 
greater willingness on the part of local governments to cooperate, however what appears 
to be a heavy-handed approach by the state, without taking into account what is already 
happening on the ground, may set back those regional efforts by beginning a new 
approach that attempts to work outside of the existing regional council structure.  
Though arriving at a specific proposal for states to follow in regard to regional 
cooperation is beyond the scope of this research project, it does seem clear that regional 
councils will continue to be limited in their ability to coordinate large-scale regional 
decision-making, even as they may be effective in facilitating interlocal agreements on 
smaller scale service delivery. Given the lack of federal policy focused on cities since the 
1980s, it seems unlikely for the federal government to get involved in regional planning 
beyond its current legislation regarding MPOs. If state governments are to grant decision-
making authority to regional councils, the councils may be capable of formulating and 
executing plans that would coordinate large-scale issues in a regional manner. As the 
comments above suggest, however, this should be done with consideration of the existing 
structure of regional governance in each state, rather than attempting to implement a 
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purely top-down approach that disregards or supersedes conversations, cooperation, or 
coordination already underway.   
Regional councils, and interjurisdictional cooperation in general, will continue to 
provide both challenges and opportunities for practitioners seeking to improve regional 
outcomes. This area of study will also continue to provide fertile ground for scholars 
rising to Elinor Ostrom‘s (1990, 216) challenge to understand why some groups 
overcome the challenges of collective action while others do not.  
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
 
1) In what state(s) does your organization operate?  
 
(If your organization works with jurisdictions in multiple states, please list those 
states.) 
 
2) What year was your organization established?  
 
3) Which best describes your organization? 
 
_1____Council of Governments (COG) 
_2____Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) 
_3____Both COG and MPO 
_____Interstate Council 
 
Other:  
 
4) Is your organization housed within a public agency, such as a City or County 
Planning Department? 
 
__2__ Yes 
__1__ No  
 
If yes, please explain:  
 
5) Do the members of your organization include: (please check all that apply) 
 
_1___Representatives from the public sector 
_2___Representatives from the private sector 
 
Other:  
 
6) Are your organization’s members: (please check all that apply) 
 
_1___Local government elected officials (such as mayors and council members) 
_2___Local government appointed officials (such as city managers, town managers, 
etc.) 
_3___Tribal leaders 
_4___State government officials 
_5___Federal officials 
_6___Non-profit organization leaders  
_7___Business leaders (such as representatives of Chambers of Commerce) 
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Other:  
 
7) Please indicate the number of members in your organization by the type of local 
government:  
 
_________Counties, Parishes or Burroughs  
_________Cities, Towns and/or Villages  
_________Tribal Councils  
_________Unincorporated Territories  
_________States  
_________Nations  
 
Other:  
 
8) Approximately how many square miles does your organization serve? 
 
_1___Less than 100 square miles 
_2___100-499 square miles 
_3___500-999 square miles 
_4___1,000-4,999 square miles 
_5___5,000-9,999 square miles 
_6___10,000-19,999 square miles 
_7___20,000 square miles or larger  
 
9) What is the approximate population of the area you serve? 
 
_1___Less than 50,000 
_2___50,000 - 99,999 
_3___100,000 - 499,999 
_4___500,000 - 999,999 
_5___1 million - 4,999,999 
_6___5 million to 9,999,999 
_7___10 million or more  
 
10) Over the past ten years, has the population in the area you serve: 
 
_1___Increased 
_2___Decreased 
_3___Stayed about the same 
 
11) Does your organization assist member jurisdictions with forming, implementing 
and/or maintaining interlocal agreements? 
 
_2___Yes 
_1___No (If no, please skip to question 13.)  
Note: Recoded to ILA Dummy. 0=no; 1=yes 
122
 
 
 
If yes, please provide any details about your work related to interlocal agreements. 
 
12) The typical interlocal agreement among your organization’s members involves 
roughly how many jurisdictions? 
 
_1___1 - 3 
_2___4 - 6 
_3___7 - 10 
_4___10 - 14 
_5___15 - 19 
_6___20 - 24 
_7___25 - 29 
_8___30 or more  
 
Please add any details regarding the size or scale of interlocal agreements among 
your organization's members. 
 
13) With which of the following types of regional activities is your organization 
involved? (please check all that apply) 
 
For all: 1=yes; 2=no 
 
____Cooperative Purchasing (please specify below) 
____Transportation Planning 
____Public Transit Services 
____Solid Waste 
____Emergency Management 
____Hazardous Materials response  
____IT or GIS services  
____Education 
____Workforce Training/Development 
____Area Agency on Aging 
 
Other:  
 
Please provide any relevant details below.  
 
14) What do you consider to be the most important service your organization offers 
to its members? 
 
15) How often does your organization hold meetings at which members meet in 
person? 
 
_0___Never 
_1___Annually   
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_2___Quarterly 
_3___Recoded: to add bimonthly between monthly and quarterly 
_4___Monthly 
_5___Weekly 
 
Other:  
 
Are members required to attend these meetings?  
 
16) Do you offer any type of incentives to encourage members to attend meetings or 
regional council events? 
 
_2___Yes 
_1___No  
 
Please explain.  
 
17) Do members face any sort of consequence if they do not attend meetings or 
regional council events? 
 
_2___Yes 
_1___No 
 
Please explain.  
 
18) To your knowledge, do members of your organization also meet independently 
of your organization’s formal meetings? 
 
_1___Yes 
_2___No 
 
Please explain.  
 
19) To the best of your knowledge, please rate the following statements on a scale of 
1 to 10, with 10 meaning that you strongly agree with the statement.  
 
a) This organization is able to effectively facilitate face-to-face interactions between 
leaders in member jurisdictions.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
 
b) Members in this organization believe that working together can lead to mutually 
beneficial outcomes.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
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c) Members are more likely to work together with other members who share a 
jurisdictional boundary, than those who are geographically located farther away.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
 
d) This organization effectively addresses interlocal issues involving many 
jurisdictions.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
 
e) Members in this organization participate in order to receive incentives such as 
funding for their jurisdictions.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
 
f) Members in this organization have competitive attitudes or rivalries that get in 
the way of working together.  
 
Scale of 1 (Do not agree) to 10 (Strongly agree) 
 
Would you like to add any comments about these items?  
 
20) Over the last three years, which of the following best describes the overall 
economic condition of the geographic area your organization serves? 
 
_1___Rapid decline 
_2___Moderate decline 
_3___Slow decline 
_4___Economic base is stable—no real growth or decline 
_5___Slow growth 
_6___Moderate growth 
_7___Rapid growth  
 
21) Over the next three years, which of the following best describes your 
expectations for the economic condition of the geographic area your organization 
serves? 
 
_1___Rapid decline 
_2___Moderate decline 
_3___Slow decline 
_4___Economic base is stable—no real growth or decline 
_5___Slow growth 
_6___Moderate growth 
_7___Rapid growth  
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22) To the best of your knowledge, which of these are reasons your members join 
your organization:  
 
a) Membership allows their jurisdiction to receive specific Federal grants. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
b) Allows their jurisdiction to receive specific State grants. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
c) Allows their jurisdiction to receive services your organization offers.  
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
d) Guarantees inclusion in a regional planning process. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
e) Saves their jurisdiction money through joint purchasing of goods or service. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
f) Facilitates interlocal government agreements. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
 
g) They are required to join by state law. 
 
_1___Yes  
_2___No  
_3___I don't know  
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23) What is the number one reason jurisdictions join your organization? 
 
24) Indicate the extent to which you believe each of the following hinder your 
organization’s work on regional initiatives.  
 
a) Important people in the region oppose cooperating. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
b) Rivalry exists between the communities represented. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
c) Local government leaders fear their community will be taken advantage of by 
other communities. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
d) Local government leaders fear their community will lose control. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
e) Leaders fear participating in a regional agreement will be too complicated. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
f) Local government leaders feel they lack the resources to participate. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
g) Membership is cost prohibitive to some potential members. 
 
Scale of 1 (Not an issue) to 10 (Causes Serious Trouble) 
 
25) This organization’s members: 
 
_1___join voluntarily. 
_2___join because a state law requires them to belong to a regional council. 
 
26) If a state law regarding regional councils was passed after your organization 
was established, did it reorganize in order to comply with state law? 
 
_1___Yes 
_2___No 
_3___Does not apply  
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Please elaborate.  
 
27) Do the members of your organization pay dues? 
 
_2___Yes 
_1___No  
 
If yes, please briefly describe how dues are structured. 
 
28) Including yourself, how many full-time employees work for your organization?  
 
29) Are you 
 
_1___Female 
_2___Male 
 
30) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
_1___High School or less 
_2___Associate's degree/Some college 
_3___Bachelor's degree 
_4___Graduate or professional degree, such as MPA or JD 
_5___Post-Graduate degree  
 
Please specify:  
 
31) Which of the following most accurately describes your race or ethnicity? 
 
_1___Caucasian/white 
_2___African-American/black 
_3___Latino or Hispanic 
_4___Asian/Pacific Islander 
_5___Native American 
_6___Multiracial  
 
32) Which of the following best describes your age range? 
 
_1___Under 24 
_2___25-34 
_3___35-44 
_4___45-54 
_5___55-64 
_6___65 or older 
 
33) Which of the following best describes your political ideology? 
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_1___Conservative 
_2___Liberal 
_3___Moderate  
 
34) Which of the following best describes your political affiliation? 
 
_1___Democrat 
_2___Libertarian 
_3___Republican 
_4___Unaffiliated or Independent 
 
Other:  
 
35) Approximately how many years have you worked in your current position? 
 
Prior to your current position, do you have additional experience with regional 
councils? 
 
36) If you would be willing to answer additional questions, please include the name 
of your organization and your preferred contact information (phone number or 
email address) here:  
 
37) Please provide the researchers with any additional information you would like 
to share about your work.  
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APPENDIX B: DATA DICTIONARY 
 
 This appendix contains the frequencies of responses gathered in the survey 
questions, which provide the data for the statistical analysis of this study.  
In what state(s) does your organization operate? 
  Frequency Percent 
Alabama 7 3.6 
Arizona 6 3.1 
Arkansas 6 3.1 
California 4 2.1 
Colorado 4 2.1 
Connecticut 4 2.1 
Delaware 1 0.5 
Florida 8 4.1 
Georgia 8 4.1 
Illinois 7 3.6 
Indiana 2 1 
Iowa 7 3.6 
Kansas 1 0.5 
Kansas, Missouri 1 0.5 
Kentucky 3 1.5 
Maine 4 2.1 
Maryland 1 0.5 
Massachusetts 4 2.1 
Michigan 1 0.5 
Minnesota 4 2.1 
Mississippi 2 1 
Missouri 5 2.6 
Nebraska 1 0.5 
Nevada 2 1 
New Hampshire 3 1.5 
New Jersey 1 0.5 
New Mexico 4 2.1 
New York 6 3.1 
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In what state(s) does your organization operate (continued)? 
  Frequency Percent 
North Carolina 8 4.1 
North Dakota 1 0.5 
Ohio 7 3.6 
Oklahoma 4 2.1 
Oregon 1 0.5 
Pennsylvania 5 2.6 
Rhode Island 1 0.5 
South Carolina 5 2.6 
South Dakota 2 1 
Tennessee 5 2.6 
Texas 7 3.6 
Utah 4 2.1 
Vermont 4 2.1 
Virginia 13 6.7 
Washington 7 3.6 
West Virginia 5 2.6 
Wisconsin 8 4.1 
Total 194 100 
 
What year was your organization established? 
  Frequency Percent 
missing 3 1.5 
1945 1 0.5 
1946 1 0.5 
1948 1 0.5 
1949, reaffirmed in 
1971 
1 0.5 
1955 2 1 
1956 1 0.5 
1958 1 0.5 
1959 2 1 
1960 2 1 
1961 3 1.5 
1962 3 1.5 
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What year was your organization established (continued)? 
  Frequency Percent 
1963 3 1.5 
1964 8 4.1 
1965 4 2.1 
1966 15 7.7 
1967 21 10.8 
1968 12 6.2 
1969 18 9.3 
1970 7 3.6 
1971 5 2.6 
1972 11 5.7 
1973 11 5.7 
1974 9 4.6 
1975 4 2.1 
1976 1 0.5 
1977 6 3.1 
1979 1 0.5 
1980 1 0.5 
1981 2 1 
1982 1 0.5 
1983 1 0.5 
1985 1 0.5 
1989 2 1 
1992 5 2.6 
1993 2 1 
1995 1 0.5 
1996 2 1 
1997 1 0.5 
2001 1 0.5 
2002 4 2.1 
2003 7 3.6 
2005 1 0.5 
2006 1 0.5 
2007 1 0.5 
Total 194 100 
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Which best describes your organization? 
  Frequency Percent 
Council of Governments (COG) 84 43.3 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) 38 19.6 
Both COG and MPO 36 18.6 
Other 28 14.4 
Total 186 95.9 
Missing 8 4.1 
  194 100.0 
 
Please indicate the number of members in your organization. 
  Frequency Percent 
10 or fewer 37 19.4% 
11 to 20 40 20.9% 
21 to 30 33 17.3% 
31 to 40 29 15.2% 
41 to 50 15 7.9% 
51 to 75 22 11.5% 
76 to 100 6 3.1% 
101 to 200 5 2.6% 
201 to 295 4 2.1% 
Total 191 100.0% 
 
Approximately how many square miles does your organization serve? 
  Frequency Percent 
Less than 100 square miles 6 3.1 
100-499 square miles 42 21.6 
500-999 square miles 21 10.8 
1,000-4,999 square miles 67 34.5 
5,000-9,999 square miles 31 16.0 
10,000-19,999 square miles 13 6.7 
20,000 square miles or larger  7 3.6 
Total 187 96.4 
Missing 7 3.6 
  194 100.0 
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What is the approximate population of the area you serve? 
  Frequency Percent 
Less than 50,000 7 3.6 
50,000 - 99,999 36 18.6 
100,000 - 499,999 104 53.6 
500,000 - 999,999 21 10.8 
1 million - 4,999,999 21 10.8 
5 million to 9,999,999 2 1.0 
10 million or more  0   
Total 191 98.5 
Missing 3 1.5 
  194 100.0 
 
Over the past ten years, has the population in the area you serve: 
  Frequency Percent 
Increased 143 73.7 
Decreased 28 14.4 
Stayed about the 
same 
22 11.3 
Total 193 99.5 
Missing 1 .5 
  194 100.0 
 
Does your organization assist member jurisdictions with forming, implementing and/or 
maintaining interlocal agreements? 
 
  Frequency Percent 
no 75 38.7 
yes 119 61.3 
Total 194 100.0 
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The typical interlocal agreement among your organization‘s members involves roughly 
how many jurisdictions? 
 
  Frequency Percent 
1 to 3 52 26.8 
4 to 6 31 16.0 
7 to 10 13 6.7 
10 to 14 3 1.5 
15 to 19 8 4.1 
20 to 24 1 .5 
25 to 29 1 .5 
30 or more 7 3.6 
Total 116 59.8 
Missing 78 40.2 
  194 100.0 
 
How often does your organization hold meetings at which members meet in person? 
  Frequency Percent 
Never 2 1.1% 
Annually 4 2.2% 
Quarterly 30 16.1% 
Bi-Monthly* 31 16.7% 
Monthly 118 63.4% 
Weekly 1 0.5% 
Total 186 100.0% 
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This organization is able to effectively facilitate face-to-face interactions between leaders 
in member jurisdictions. 
 
  Frequency Percent 
1 1 .5 
3 2 1.0 
4 3 1.5 
5 7 3.6 
6 7 3.6 
7 23 11.9 
8 41 21.1 
9 30 15.5 
10 79 40.7 
Total 193 99.5 
Missing 1 .5 
  194 100.0 
 
Members in this organization believe that working together can lead to mutually 
beneficial outcomes. 
 
  Frequency Percent 
1 1 .5 
2 1 .5 
3 1 .5 
5 4 2.1 
6 9 4.6 
7 26 13.4 
8 35 18.0 
9 31 16.0 
10 85 43.8 
Total 193 99.5 
Missing 1 .5 
  194 100.0 
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Members in this organization have competitive attitudes or rivalries that get in the way of 
working together. 
 
  Frequency Percent 
1 22 11.3 
2 36 18.6 
3 37 19.1 
4 11 5.7 
5 31 16.0 
6 12 6.2 
7 14 7.2 
8 13 6.7 
9 10 5.2 
10 7 3.6 
Total 193 99.5 
Missing 1 .5 
  194 100.0 
 
Over the last three years, which of the following best describes the overall economic 
condition of the geographic area your organization serves? 
 
  Frequency Percent 
Rapid decline 6 3.1 
Moderate decline 34 17.5 
Slow decline 24 12.4 
Economic base is stable—no real 
growth or decline 
52 26.8 
Slow growth 44 22.7 
Moderate growth 26 13.4 
Rapid growth  8 4.1 
Total 194 100.0 
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APPENDIX C: LEGISLATION BY STATE 
 
State Statute Date Type of Legislation 
Northeast Region 
Connecticut 
Connecticut General Statutes Section 
Sec. 8-31a. Formation of regional 
planning agencies. Representation. 
1959 2 
Maine 
Maine Revised Statute Title 30-A, 
Chapter 119: REGIONAL 
COOPERATION. Subchapter 1: 
Regional Councils 
1987 1 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts General Law, Part 1, Title 
7, Chapter 40B: Regional Planning 
1968? 1 
New Hampshire 
TITLE III TOWNS, CITIES, VILLAGE 
DISTRICTS, AND 
UNINCORPORATED 
PLACES,CHAPTER 36 REGIONAL 
PLANNING COMMISSIONS, Section 
36:1 Definitions; RSA 36:45-53. 
1970 2 
Rhode Island     0 
Vermont 
Title 24: Municipal and County 
Government, Chapter 117: MUNICIPAL 
AND REGIONAL PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 24 V.S.A. § 4321. 
Creation of planning commissions 
1968 1 
New Jersey 
New Jersey Code, TITLE 40 - 
MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES, 
Section 40:55D, 40:55D-84 - Regional 
planning board;  powers 
1975 1 
New York 
 New York Code - Laws: General 
Municipal : Article 12-B - COUNTY 
PLANNING BOARDS AND 
REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCILS; 
Article 5-G of the New York State 
General Municipal Law 
  1 
Pennsylvania 
Intergovernmental Cooperation Law, 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 
Title 53, Municipalities Generally, Sub-
chapter A ―Intergovernmental 
Cooperation.‖ (Also known as Act 180 
of 1972, Act 177 of 1996, and Act 13 of 
2001 
1943, 
1972 
1 
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State Statute Date Type of Legislation 
Midwest Region 
Illinois 
Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 55, 
Division 5-14. Regional Planning 
1929 2 
Indiana 
Indiana Code, 36-7-7: Chapter 7. 
Regional Planning Commissions 
1981 1 
Michigan 
Regional Planning Act 281 of 1945: 
125.11 - 125.25 
1945 1 
Ohio 
Ohio Revised Code: Chapter 167: 
REGIONAL COUNCILS OF 
GOVERNMENTS 
1967 1 
Wisconsin 
Wisconsin Code: Chapter 66. General 
municipality law. 66.0309 Creation, 
organization, powers and duties of 
regional planning commissions. 
1959 1 
Iowa 
Iowa Code Chapter 28H: Councils of 
Government 
1972 2 
Kansas 
Kansas Statutes Annotated Chapter 12, 
Article 7 
1992 1 
Minnesota 
Minnesota Regional Development Act: 
Laws of Minnesota, Chapter 462 
1969 2 
Missouri Missouri Revised Statutes, Chapter 251 1965 2 
Nebraska Nebraska Revised Statute 13-1902 1992 2 
North Dakota 
NDCC CHAPTER 54-40.1: REGIONAL 
PLANNING COUNCILS 
1978? 2 
South Dakota 
Executive Order of  Governor Frank 
Farrar  
1970 2 
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State Statute Date Type of Legislation 
South Region 
Delaware 
Delaware Code, Title 9 - Counties, 
CHAPTER 48. REGIONAL 
PLANNING 
1953 2 
Florida Florida Statutes 186.504, and 186.505 1972? 2 
Georgia 
The Georgia Planning Act 1989: 50-8-
34. 
1989 2 
Maryland 
Maryland Code: 11 Subtitles, for each 
RC in the state, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, TITLE 13 - 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
RESOURCES 
1956 2 
North Carolina 
GS § 160A-470: Creation of Regional 
Councils 
1971 2 
South Carolina 
SECTION 6-7-110. Authorization and 
geographic groupings for regional 
councils of government; participation by 
municipalities.  
1962 2 
Virginia 
Regional Cooperation Act. Title 15.2, 
Chapter 42 
1968 2 
West Virginia 
WEST VIRGINIA CODE, CHAPTER 8. 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
ARTICLE 25. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS -- REGIONAL 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT.  
1971 2 
Alabama 
Code of Alabama, Sections 11-85-1 
though -7 
1935; 
1969 
2 
Kentucky KY Rev Stat § 147A.050  1972 2 
Mississippi 
SEC. 57-10-513. General powers and 
duties of planning and development 
districts and qualified entities. 
1972? 2 
Tennessee 
Development District Act of 1965; 
Tennessee Code Title 13, Chapter 14 
1965 2 
Arkansas 
Title 14  Local Government, Subtitle 2.  
County Government, Chapter 17  County 
Planning, Subchapter 3  -- Metropolitan 
or Regional Planning Commissions 
1955 1 
Louisiana 
TITLE 33 — Municipalities and 
parishes, RS 33:131 — Creation of 
regional planning areas 
1956? 2 
Oklahoma Executive Order 1971 2 
Texas 
Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 
391. Regional Planning Commissions. 
1987? 2 
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State Statute Date Type of Legislation 
West Region 
Arizona Executive Order 70-2 1970 2 
Colorado 
Colorado Revised Statutes: 29-1-201. 
Legislative declaration. 
1970 1 
Idaho 
Idaho Statutes: 67-6505. Joint planning 
and zoning commission -- Formation -- 
Duties. 
1967? 1 
Montana     0 
Nevada     0 
New Mexico 
New Mexico Statutes, Chapter 4: 
Counties, Article 58: Planning Districts, 
4-58-1 through 4-58-6, Section 4-58-4: 
Recognized regional councils. 
1978 2 
Utah executive order on May 17, 1970 1970 2 
Wyoming     0 
Alaska     0 
California 
joint powers authority law, California 
Government Code Section 6500 
  1 
Hawaii 
Honolulu City Council Policy Resolution 
01-37  
  0 
Oregon Oregon Code 190.010 1953 1 
Washington 
Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 
chapter 36.64.080 
1965 1 
 
Note: Type of State Legislation is coded as follows 
0=None  
1=Enabling  
2=Prescriptive 
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